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ORAL ADVOCACY BEFORE THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: DOES IT AFFECT 
THE JUSTICES’ DECISIONS?† 
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON∗ 
JAMES F. SPRIGGS II∗∗ 
PAUL J. WAHLBECK∗∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A rarely challenged assertion among appellate court judges, lawyers 
who engage in appellate work, and scholars who teach and study appellate 
practice is the following: oral argument is an important, if not key, 
element in the process of successfully appealing a case.1 Textbooks on 
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 1. Advocates, legal scholars, and judges often agree that appellate-level oral arguments are 
important. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 
(2d ed. 2003); AM. BAR ASS’N, APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL (Pricilla Anne Schwab, ed., 1992); 
ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1989); Myron H. Bright, The 
Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IOWA L. REV. 35 (1986); Joseph W. 
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appellate practice routinely declare that lawyers must adequately prepare 
for oral argument and outline assorted tactics for enhancing the likelihood 
of success on appeal. According to Robert Stern, “It has become axiomatic 
for writers on appellate advocacy, many of whom are appellate judges, to 
emphasize the importance of oral argument.”2 Judges also often echo this 
idea. For instance, Myron Bright declares that “[i]n my opinion, oral 
argument is an essential component of the decisionmaking process, and 
plays an important role in assisting the appellate judge in reaching a 
decision.”3 These types of assertions make an assumption that has not yet 
been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis—that oral arguments 
provide information of value to judges and that they can, at times, 
influence case outcomes. 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices generally agree with this conventional 
view of oral advocacy. They commonly express the belief that when they 
sit for oral arguments to discuss cases with counsel and among 
themselves, these proceedings can play a critical role in how they decide. 
Former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that, in most cases, the 
impressions a Justice develops during oral arguments “accord[] with the 
conviction which controls his final vote.”4 Two decades later Justice 
Robert Jackson echoed the sentiments of the former Chief: “I think the 
Justices would answer unanimously that now, as traditionally, they rely 
heavily on oral presentations. . . . [I]t always is of the highest, and often of 
controlling, importance.”5  
Current Justices find the arguments are a critical part of their decision 
making process. As Justice Antonin Scalia quipped, he initially believed 
oral arguments were “a dog and pony show” before joining the bench, but 
after sitting for almost two decades he believes that “[t]hings . . . can be 
put in perspective during oral argument in a way that they can’t in a 
written brief.”6 This sort of thinking led Justice Harlan to advise lawyers 
that “your oral argument on an appeal is perhaps the most effective 
 
 
Hatchett & Robert J. Telfer, III, The Importance of Appellate Oral Argument, 33 STETSON L. REV. 139 
(2003); Stanley Mosk, In Defense of Oral Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25 (1999). But see 
Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional 
Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1986) (questioning the value of oral arguments at appellate courts).  
 2. STERN, supra note 1, at 363. 
 3. Bright, supra note 1, at 36. 
 4. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1928). 
 5. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case 
Presentation, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 801 (1951). 
 6. DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER 282 (4th ed. 1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
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weapon you have got if you will give it the time and attention it 
deserves.”7 These insights suggest that these proceedings may provide 
critical information for Supreme Court Justices which, in turn, may affect 
their decisions on the merits of a case.8  
This received wisdom among lawyers and judges, however, is 
generally not shared by political scientists who study appellate courts. 
They have produced a considerable amount of research explaining the 
decisions of appellate courts, showing that a host of variables influence the 
outcomes of cases. Among these explanatory factors are judges’ 
ideological orientations, strategic considerations resulting in intracourt 
bargaining over opinion drafts, legal norms, contextual factors such as 
workload, and case characteristics.9 While there has been little systematic 
research done on oral arguments, political scientists often assume that, 
after one controls for the factors generally shown to influence court 
outcomes, there is little variation left for oral arguments to explain. In 
addition, they suggest that the institutional setting of the Supreme Court 
 
 
 7. John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?, 41 
CORNELL L.Q. 6, 11 (1956). 
 8. Many other Justices agree with their colleagues. For instance, Justice Brennan suggests that, 
while not controlling his votes, this process helps form his substantive assumptions about a case: 
“Often my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument. This happens even 
though I read the briefs before oral argument. . . . Often my idea of how a case shapes up is changed 
by oral argument . . . .” ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. 
GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 671 (8th ed. 2002) [hereinafter STERN ET AL.]. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist agrees with this assertion and states that oral advocacy has affected his thoughts about 
specific cases: “In a significant minority of the cases in which I have heard oral argument, I have left 
the bench feeling differently about a case than I did when I came on the bench. The change is seldom a 
full one-hundred-and-eighty-degree swing . . . .” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243–
44 (2d ed. 2001). More specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that a good oral argument “will 
have something to do with how the case comes out.” Id. at 244. In general, the point is that even 
though oral arguments may not control the outcome of a case in terms of changing votes, they may 
provide key information to the Justices, so the importance of these proceedings cannot be overlooked. 
Note that there has been criticism of the process. For instance, Justice Powell was disappointed at the 
level of advocacy when he joined the bench. “I certainly had expected that there would be relatively 
few mediocre performances before the Court. I regret to say that performance has not measured up to 
my expectations.” STERN ET AL., supra, at 671. 
 9. See, e.g., HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
(2006); VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & WENDY MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL 
COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISION MAKING (2006) [hereinafter 
HETTINGER ET AL.]; DAVID KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002); 
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000) [hereinafter MALTZMAN ET AL.]; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002);  
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. 
SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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renders the oral argument stage somewhat irrelevant to decisional 
outcomes. Justices, after all, have reasonably strong preferences, and the 
agenda-setting process results in a plenary docket comprised of cases 
having thorny factual and legal issues and containing precedents on both 
sides of the issue. Segal and Spaeth articulate the textbook political 
science view, noting that there is no systematic empirical evidence that 
“oral argument regularly, or even infrequently, determines who wins and 
who loses.”10  
This divergence between the conventional wisdom in the legal 
academy and the almost dismissive viewpoint of the political science 
literature raises the empirical question at the heart of our study: do oral 
arguments actually matter at the U.S. Supreme Court? That is, what, if 
any, information do the Justices actually garner from these proceedings, 
and what consequences, if any, does such information have for the 
outcomes of cases? While a small literature has developed on this topic, 
the vast majority of the work is case studies that focus on how one or a 
few cases were affected by what transpired during these proceedings.11 
Our goal is to move beyond these largely anecdotal accounts to provide 
systematic quantitative evidence showing that Justices are influenced by 
the arguments put forward by lawyers.  
In this Article, we are interested in testing empirically the extent to 
which Justices utilize information that can be drawn from the oral 
arguments, as well as the extent to which such information affects the 
decisions they make. In order to do so, we draw on a unique set of data: 
notes taken by former Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun as he sat on 
the bench during oral arguments. In each case, he took notes that include 
 
 
 10. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 280. See THOMAS G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 106 (1993) (suggesting that, while orals 
are relevant, “[p]robably few [of the Justices’] minds are significantly changed”). 
 11. A small, but rich, cross-disciplinary literature suggests that the Justices garner information 
about their legal and policy choices, and that this information is ultimately used in majority opinions. 
See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2004) (providing a systematic analysis); William L. Benoit, Attorney 
Argumentation and Supreme Court Opinions, 26 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 22 (1989) (providing 
anecdotal evidence); see also Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court 
Advocacy: An Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 89 (1978); Neil D. McFeeley & Richard J. Ault, Supreme Court Oral Argument: An Exploratory 
Analysis, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 52 (1979); Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the 
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 
1187 (1975); Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D’Amato & Rosemary Metrailer, The Functions of Oral 
Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q. J. SPEECH 410 (1976) [hereinafter Wasby et al.]. But cf. 
Warren D. Wolfson, Oral Argument: Does It Matter?, 35 IND. L. REV. 451, 454 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
p457 Johnson Spriggs Wahlbeck book pages.doc1/22/08 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE INFLUENCE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 461 
 
 
 
 
information perfectly tailored for investigating the role of oral arguments 
at the Court. Among other things, his oral argument notes record a grade 
for each attorney’s oral presentation before the Court and contain 
comments raised by his colleagues. His oral argument notes even go so far 
as to predict the other Justices’ final votes on the merits in many cases. 
Our empirical investigation focuses on two areas. First, we are 
interested in the quality of the oral advocacy presented to the Court, 
especially in terms of its etiology, as well as its effectiveness. We 
investigate these questions empirically by utilizing notes taken by 
Blackmun during oral arguments while he sat on the Court. Specifically, 
we here utilize the grades that Justice Blackmun assigned to each 
attorney’s oral arguments. This information allows us to answer two 
related questions: (1) why do some attorneys make better arguments 
before the Court; and (2) does the quality of oral advocacy influence who 
wins and loses? 
Second, we turn our attention to the information the Justices elicit 
about themselves during oral arguments. We analyze data on how often 
Justice Blackmun paid attention to the views expressed by his brethren 
during oral arguments (by examining when and why he recorded the 
comments of a particular colleague during orals) and the factors that led 
him to pay attention to some, but not all, of his colleagues. Additionally, 
we utilize Blackmun’s notes to demonstrate that what transpired during 
oral arguments provided him with an indication of whether his colleagues 
would vote to affirm or reverse the lower court decision at issue. We do so 
through an examination of when Justice Blackmun attempted to predict 
the votes of his colleagues in his oral argument notes. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In the next two Parts, we take up our 
first set of questions, which focuses on whether experienced and 
resourceful attorneys provide better arguments and whether arguments 
presented by counsel can affect decisions Justices make. Part IV focuses 
on whether Justices attempt to learn about their colleagues during oral 
arguments and whether such information affects the coalition-formation 
process that follows the arguments. Finally, we analyze whether what 
transpires during oral arguments can help a Justice make predictions about 
how a case will ultimately be decided.  
II. INFORMATION AND ORAL ARGUMENT 
Our most general claim is that oral arguments provide information that 
can reduce the Justices’ uncertainty regarding aspects of a case. While the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Justices generally come to these proceedings after reading the written 
briefs and the lower court record, they often still face some degree of 
uncertainty regarding what are generally complex legal and factual issues. 
The Justices, for example, need an understanding of the legal status quo, 
the policy choices available to them, the likely effect that different legal 
rulings will have on the litigants and other similarly situated parties, and 
the like. 
It is in this context that lawyers appear before the Court and attempt to 
provide the Justices with information that will help their clients’ cause. 
Counsel appearing before the bench can do so by providing “a clear 
presentation of the issues, of the relationship of those issues to existing 
law, and of the implications of a decision for public policy.”12 As Justice 
Blackmun suggests, “A good oralist can add a lot to a case and help [us] in 
our later analysis of what the case is all about. . . . Many times confusion 
[in the brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say.”13 Johnson, for 
example, provides evidence that Justices often “seek new information 
during these proceedings,” especially when they are more uncertain about 
how to act and when a case is more complex.14 These proceedings thus 
have the potential to crystallize Justices’ views or to move them toward a 
particular outcome.15 
Justices themselves, in their writings and speeches, provide hints as to 
why oral arguments provide information relevant for deciding cases.16 For 
them, there are two main pieces of information they can gather from these 
proceedings: information they draw out of counsel about the Court’s legal 
and policy options and information about how their colleagues view the 
case. They further suggest that these sources of information are helpful as 
they deliberate over the answers to legal questions before them. We 
consider these two types of information in turn.  
First, and most basically, Justices posit that during oral arguments, 
counsel provide information that helps them decide on the merits of cases 
they hear. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist pointed out that 
discussing a case directly with the advocates allows Justices to evaluate 
 
 
 12. Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of Public 
Nuisance, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 613, 623 (1998) (citing Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the 
Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995)). 
 13. Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298 (2000). 
 14. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5. 
 15. See, e.g., Wasby et al., supra note 11; JOHNSON, supra note 11. 
 16. This part draws on JOHNSON, supra note 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
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counsel’s “strong points and your weak points, and to ask . . . some 
questions [about the case].”17 Further, Justice Byron White argued that 
during these proceedings, the Court treats lawyers as resources to provide 
new or clarifying information so that the Justices can gain a clearer picture 
of the case at hand.18 This suggests that there may be points about which 
the Justices are still unclear after reading the briefs, and a face-to-face 
exchange can help them clarify their thinking. As Justice Rehnquist added: 
“One can do his level best to digest from the briefs . . . what he believes 
necessary to decide the case, and still find himself falling short in one 
aspect or another of either the law or the facts. Oral argument can cure 
these shortcomings.”19  
This function should not be overlooked. As Justice John Harlan argued, 
“[T]here is no substitute . . . for the Socratic method of procedure in 
getting at the real heart of an issue and in finding out where the truth 
lies.”20 Thus, one specific function of the arguments is to allow counsel to 
convey information that may help the Court deal with specific issues of a 
case.  
That the Justices gather information from counsel during oral argument 
is intuitive. While the briefs may address almost every legal intricacy, 
counsel cannot always know what information the Justices want. It is only 
during oral arguments, then, that Justices can discuss with counsel those 
points that pique their interests. As Justice Rehnquist suggested, “[O]ral 
argument offers . . . a direct interchange of ideas between court and 
counsel. . . . Counsel can play a significant role in responding to the 
concerns of the judges, concerns that counsel won’t always be able to 
anticipate in preparing the briefs.”21 This, Rehnquist argued, is important 
because it allows the Justices to begin to form their thoughts about how 
they may ultimately rule: “Probably the most important catalyst for 
generating further thought was the oral argument of that case.”22 Thus, 
these proceedings provide a time for Justices to raise issues that they 
believe will help decide a case.23 
 
 
 17. William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015 
(1984). 
 18. Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST. 
B. J. 346, 383 (1982). 
 19. REHNQUIST, supra note 8, at 245. 
 20. Harlan, supra note 7, at 7. 
 21. Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 1021. 
 22. REHNQUIST, supra note 8, at 241. 
 23. See JOHNSON, supra note 11; Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, beyond gathering information from the advocates, Justices 
posit that oral arguments can clarify their own thinking and “perhaps that 
of their colleagues.”24 In other words, during these proceedings, they 
contemplate how the arguments relate to their own, as well as to their 
colleagues’, vote to reverse or affirm the lower court decision. They do so 
by speaking with one another as much as they speak with counsel.25 As 
Justice Scalia stated almost two decades ago, “It isn’t just an interchange 
between counsel and each of the individual Justices; what is going on is to 
some extent an exchange of information among Justices themselves.”26 
Other Justices and the lawyers involved in the process have echoed similar 
sentiments.27 In short, questions Justices ask during oral arguments have 
as much to do with eliciting information from counsel as they do with 
telling their colleagues how they view a case.28 
 
 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331 (2001). 
 24. See White, supra note 18, at 383. Additionally, it is interesting to note that at least one former 
Justice attempted to test this argument. Chief Justice Hughes provided anecdotal evidence that a 
Justice’s impressions of a case after oral argument often conform to his or her final votes. He 
suggested that one of his colleagues from the New York Court of Appeals kept track of his immediate, 
post-oral-argument impressions of a case, and that 90% of the time these thoughts accorded with his 
final vote. HUGHES, supra note 4, at 62. This conclusion is supported by Justice Harlan’s experience 
with oral arguments several years later. 
 When he kept a similar diary, Harlan found that “more times than not—the views which I had at 
the end of the day’s session jibed with the final views that I formed after the more careful study of the 
briefs . . . .” Harlan, supra note 7, at 7. Judges Richard Arnold and Myron Bright kept records at the 
Eighth Circuit for cases decided between September 1982 and June 1983, comparing their views of the 
cases pre– and post–oral argument. Judge Bright’s view changed after oral arguments in 31% of cases, 
and Judge Arnold’s view differed after oral arguments in 17% of cases. Bright, supra note 1, at 40. 
 25. For instance, E. Barrett Prettyman’s analysis of hypothetical questions indicates that Justices 
are communicating with one another through these types of questions. See E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., 
The Supreme Court’s Use of Hypothetical Questions at Oral Argument, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 555, 556 
(1984). 
 26. Interview by Paul Duke with Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, THIS 
HONORABLE COURT (PBS Video 1988).  
 27. Justice Stevens (as quoted by Justice Kennedy) said: “[During oral arguments] the Court is 
having a conversation with itself through the intermediary of the attorney.” Interview by A.E. Dick 
Howard with Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT 
VISITORS FILM (1997). Lawyers who appear before the Court confirm this point. As former Solicitor  
General Ted Olson put it, “It's like a highly stylized Japanese theater. . . . The Justices use questions to 
make points to their colleagues.” Joan Biskupic, Justices Make Points by Questioning Lawyers: High 
Court May Hint at Views in Oral Arguments, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 2006, at 7A, available at 2006 
WLNR 17320019.  See also Hatchett & Telfer, supra note 1, at 144. 
 28. Johnson provides initial anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon. JOHNSON, supra note 11. 
Specifically, his analysis of 75 civil liberties cases decided between 1972 and 1986 demonstrates that 
Justices listen to their colleagues, sometimes quite closely, during these proceedings. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
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III. DOES THE QUALITY OF ORAL ADVOCACY AFFECT SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS? 
To plumb the extent to which arguments put forth by counsel during 
oral arguments can affect the Justices’ decisions, we analyze an interesting 
source of data: Justice Harry Blackmun’s contemporaneous evaluations of 
the arguments presented by attorneys who participated in these 
proceedings. Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, Justice 
Blackmun served on the Court until his retirement in 1994. During this 
time, Justice Blackmun took extensive notes while he sat on the bench for 
oral arguments. In fact, notes exist in his files at the Library of Congress 
for almost every case in which he sat. He also kept similar notes for a 
shorter time period while he sat on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
from 1959 to 1970. His Eighth Circuit notes, taken from 1961 to 1970, are 
also available at the Library of Congress. 
Specifically, Justice Blackmun’s Supreme Court oral argument notes 
include substantive comments about each attorney’s positions and a grade 
for oral argument, as well as notes and comments regarding what other 
Justices said at orals. For example, in Florida Department of State v. 
Treasure Salvors,29 Blackmun wrote ten substantive comments about the 
argument made by the respondent’s attorney, Paul Horan, and then noted 
that “[h]e makes t[he] most o[f] a thin, tough case.”30 The attorney then 
earned a 6 on Blackmun’s 8-point grading scale. In First National 
Maintenance Corporation v. N.L.R.B.,31 Blackmun wrote of the 
petitioner’s attorney, “The argument has persuaded me to reverse,” when 
assigning him a score of 5 on his 8-point scale.32 Blackmun also offered 
harsher evaluations at times. He commented on the Nebraska Assistant 
Attorney General’s argument in Murphy v. Hunt33 by noting, “very 
confusing talk about Nebraska’s bail statutes;” the attorney received a 
grade of 4.34 Similarly, in Kugler v. Helfant,35 the respondent’s attorney 
 
 
 29. 458 U.S. 670 (1982). 
 30. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 20, 1982) (on 
file with Washington University Law Review). Justice Blackmun used a set of cryptic abbreviations in 
his notes. Specifically, here, he wrote, “He makes t most o a thin, tough case.” Of the other attorney in 
the case, Susan Smathers, Blackmun noted “She hangs in there.” Id. 
 31. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
 32. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 21, 1981) 
(on file in the Personal Papers of Justice Blackmun, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
 33. 455 U.S. 478 (1982). 
 34. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 18, 1982) (on 
file with the Library of Congress).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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earned a “C” (on Blackmun’s A–F scale) along with the notation, “He 
goes too far.”36  
To provide an even clearer picture of how Justice Blackmun recorded 
his grades, Figure 1 shows his notes from Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.37 Here, 
Larry E. Forrester, arguing for Belknap, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
representing the National Labor Relations Board, earned a 4 (noted right 
after their names) on Blackmun’s 8-point scale, while Cecil Davenport 
earned a 5 (again, noted after his name). Davenport’s client won the case. 
FIGURE 1: BLACKMUN’S ORAL ARGUMENT NOTES IN BELKNAP, INC. V. 
HALE (1983) 
 
 
Other Justices have made notations after sitting for oral arguments; this 
further indicates the role of oral arguments in the decisional process. 
 
 
 35. 421 U.S. 117 (1975). 
 36. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 25, 1975) 
(on file with the Library of Congress). 
 37. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
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Justice Powell’s oral argument notes are replete with examples of how 
information from these proceedings helped him decide cases. For instance, 
in United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm Film,38 Justice Powell 
wrote, “[A]rgument was helpful, especially as a summary of previous law-
read transcript.”39 Again, in EPA v. Mink,40 Powell notes that Assistant 
Attorney General Roger C. Cramton provided an “excellent argument (use 
transcript if we write).”41 Similarly, after the respondent’s argument in 
Jensen v. Quaring,42 Blackmun indicated that “[t]his simplifies things for 
me.”43  
In the next part, we turn to a direct empirical examination of the 
following two factors: (1) the determinants of the quality of an attorney’s 
oral argument (based on Justice Blackmun’s grading of each attorney’s 
performance at orals); and (2) the influence that oral arguments exert on 
Justices’ voting behavior, as determined by the extent to which the quality 
of an attorney’s oral arguments correlates with the Justices’ votes for her 
client. 
A. Probing the Quality of Oral Arguments 
The first step in our analysis is an examination of the factors, suggested 
by our theory, associated with Justice Blackmun’s evaluations of an 
attorney’s oral arguments. We do so for two reasons. First, it is 
substantively interesting to know whether these grades are related to the 
factors that scholars generally associate with a well-spoken attorney—
namely, the educational and career experience of attorneys coupled with 
their reputational resources. Second, this analysis will help to establish the 
underlying validity of these data as a measure of the quality of oral 
argumentation. We are especially interested in showing that these grades 
are not a function of Justice Blackmun’s ideological proclivity to prefer 
one attorney’s position over the other’s arguments. We contend, and show 
 
 
 38. 413 U.S. 123 (1973). 
 39. Oral Argument Notes from Lewis Powell, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 19, 1972) (on 
file with Washington and Lee University Law School).  
 40. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
 41. Oral Argument Notes from Lewis Powell, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 9, 1972) (on 
file with Washington and Lee University Law School). 
 42. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985). 
 43. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 7, 1985) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
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empirically, that Blackmun’s evaluations of attorneys’ arguments can 
plausibly be seen as a measure of their quality.  
Based on the public statements and private writing of Supreme Court 
Justices, as well as the empirical data from legal scholars and political 
scientists, we seek to test a series of hypotheses about how the arguments 
presented to the Court may affect the choices Justices make. Our 
hypotheses in this part are grounded in two literatures. First, we draw upon 
the social choice literature that focuses on how information generally 
affects human interactions. We then combine this broad theoretical 
foundation with ideas from existing literature on how information and 
cues may affect decisions made by the Supreme Court.  
Among analysts who study human interaction, and particularly 
interaction between political actors, it is widely recognized that for 
information to be effective, decision makers must perceive the source of 
the information to be credible or reliable.44 The credibility of an 
information source hinges in part on whether the recipient believes the 
sender to be well informed and candid on the subject of the 
communication. The reasoning is intuitive: if the receiver considers the 
sender to be ill informed, then any information conveyed is likely to be 
discounted as being possibly inaccurate or misleading.45 
A long-standing idea in the literature on law and courts is that repeat 
players, by virtue of factors including experience and resources, are more 
likely to enjoy litigation success.46 In the context of the Supreme Court, a 
key indicator of credibility is a lawyer’s litigating experience, especially 
the extent to which an attorney appeared before the Court in the past. For 
instance, McGuire finds that attorneys who litigate before the Court more 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN 
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY REALLY NEED TO KNOW? (1998); David Austen-Smith, Information 
and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (1993); Vincent P. Crawford 
& Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982); Joseph Farrell & 
Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1996). While gathering information, decision 
makers must assess its credibility because the efficacy of information provided to an actor depends on 
the credibility of the source in the eyes of the recipient. As Austen-Smith puts it in his examination of 
Congress: “[T]he extent to which any information offered . . . is effective depends on the credibility of 
the lobbyist to the legislator in question. Such credibility . . . depends partly upon how closely the 
lobbyist’s preferences over consequences reflect those of the legislator being lobbied, and on how 
confident is the legislator that the lobbyist is in fact informed.” Austen-Smith, supra, at 800.  
 45. See Austen-Smith, supra note 44. 
 46. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–104 (1974) (describing the advantages enjoyed by repeat 
players); See also CLEMENT VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959). 
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frequently than their competitors are more likely to prevail in their case.47 
As such, we hypothesize:  
Litigating Experience Hypothesis: Attorneys with more experience 
arguing before the Court at oral arguments will earn higher 
evaluations from Justice Blackmun. 
The quintessential repeat player—the Solicitor General—is a 
consistently successful advocate before the Court;48 in fact, the Solicitor 
General’s office wins about 70% of the cases in which the U.S. 
government participates.49 While scholars have offered various 
explanations for the Solicitor General’s success, it is generally agreed that 
the nation’s best appellate advocates often work for this office and become 
among the most experienced attorneys to appear before the Court.50 This 
means the Justices may be particularly interested in the Solicitor General’s 
view of a case. As Justice Powell put it to Chief Justice Burger in one 
case: “[T]he importance of this case—and the interest of the 
government—justify giving the Solicitor General 15 minutes [for oral 
argument]. . . . He may be more helpful than the more partisan counsel.”51 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
 
 47. See KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON 
COMMUNITY (1993); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 
POL. RES. Q. 505 (1998) [hereinafter McGuire, Explaining Executive Success]; Kevin T. McGuire, 
Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. 
POL. 187 (1995) [hereinafter McGuire, Repeat Players]. 
 48. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and 
Burger Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 138 (1988) (presenting data on success rates of 
Solicitors General representing the government from the Eisenhower administration to the Reagan 
administration); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of 
Presidential Appointments, 43 W. POL. Q. 137, 140 (1990) (reviewing the literature on the Solicitors 
General’s success rates). 
 49. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 4 (1987) (documenting that the Solicitor General in 
1983 had 79% of his certiorari petitions granted and prevailed in 83% of cases in which he 
participated); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 29 (1992) 
(reporting that the government won 67.6% of the cases in which it participated during the 1959 to 
1989 Terms); Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: 
The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision-Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 
79 (2005) [hereinafter Bailey et al.] (finding that the Supreme Court “embraced the position advocated 
by the S.G. 68% of the time”).  
 50. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success, supra note 47, at 505 (stating that the Solicitor 
General is the “prototypical repeat player” by virtue of being a frequent litigant). 
 51. Lewis F. Powell, Chambers Actions on Miscellaneous Motions, Sept. 23, 1982 (on file in the 
Personal Papers of Harry Blackmun, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.). 
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Solicitor General Hypothesis: Attorneys from the Solicitor 
General’s office are more likely to earn higher marks from Justice 
Blackmun. 
While the Solicitor General’s office argues on behalf of the federal 
government, there are cases when attorneys from a particular agency argue 
or when the Attorney General personally argues. These attorneys, like 
Solicitors General, have experience and resources that are likely to make 
them stronger litigators than nongovernmental attorneys. Thus, we predict: 
Federal Government Attorney Hypothesis: Federal government 
attorneys, other than attorneys from the Solicitor General’s office, 
should receive higher grades from Justice Blackmun than other 
attorneys. 
The credibility of attorneys is also tied to the education they receive. 
We expect that attorneys who received their education at prestigious law 
schools are more likely to be accorded respect by the Justices because they 
are deemed credible sources of information.52 Empirically, Justice 
Blackmun’s oral argument notes provide evidence that he was cognizant 
of where those appearing at oral arguments attended law school. For 
instance, in Southland Corporation v. Keating,53 he noted of John F. Wells 
(counsel for appellees): “This guy was #2 at Stanford when [Rehnquist] 
was #1 and [O’Connor was] #3.”54 Similarly, in Monroe v. Standard Oil 
Company,55 he indicated that appellee attorney Paul S. McAuliffe had a 
degree from Yale.56 McGuire’s findings and Blackmun’s attention to this 
detail lead us to predict: 
Elite Law School Hypothesis: Attorneys educated at more 
prestigious law schools are likely to earn higher grades from 
Blackmun. 
Beyond the contribution of education, attorneys bring unique 
professional experiences that add to their professional training. For some 
Supreme Court litigators, a crucial component of their training was a 
 
 
 52. See MCGUIRE, supra note 47, at 39–41 (explaining that “prestigious legal training leads to a 
fruitful practice”). 
 53. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 54. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 4, 1983) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
 55. 452 U.S. 549 (1981). 
 56. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 4, 1981) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
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clerkship on the Court. After working at the Court for a year or two, clerks 
become adept at understanding which arguments are likely to garner five 
votes, and which arguments will be less likely to have any effect on the 
outcome of a case. As a result, McGuire suggests that “former clerks are 
highly valued as Supreme Court litigators” and may therefore have an 
enhanced ability to offer arguments that will sway the Justices.57 As with 
law school prestige, Justice Blackmun took notice of this factor at oral 
arguments; in Daniels v. Williams,58 he describes attorney Stephen Allan 
Saltzburg as a “[Marshall] clerk.”59 Further, in United States v. American 
Bar Endowment60 he notes that Francis M. Gregory was a “[Brennan] 
clerk”61; and in United States v. Halper,62 he recorded that John Roberts 
was a “[Rehnquist] clerk.”63 Thus, we predict: 
Former Clerk Hypothesis: Former Supreme Court clerks are more 
likely to earn higher marks than attorneys who did not clerk. 
McGuire finds evidence that members of what he terms the 
“Washington Elite” (i.e., private attorneys working in Washington, D.C.) 
are more successful than other private attorneys because they are seen as 
providing more credible and better arguments to the Justices.64 This may 
be due to their relationship with, and proximity to, the Court.65 This leads 
us to predict:  
Washington Elite Hypothesis: Private attorneys from Washington, 
D.C., are more likely to earn higher evaluations than are attorneys 
from outside Washington, D.C. 
Academic lawyers and lawyers for interest groups are also often 
viewed as “notable practitioners,” and they often have more experience 
 
 
 57. MCGUIRE, supra note 47, at 163. 
 58. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 59. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 6, 1985) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
 60. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). 
 61. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 28, 1986) 
(on file with the Library of Congress). 
 62. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).  
 63. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1989) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
 64. MCGUIRE, supra note 47, at 183–84 (showing that Washington attorneys who are Supreme 
Court practitioners with a reputation “for performing sound and solid work in the Court” are more 
likely to influence the Supreme Court’s case selection). 
 65. Id. at 183 (stating that “experts who work in close proximity to the Court appear to have a 
strong impact on its proceedings”). 
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than other attorneys.66 We expect, then, that academic counsel such as 
Laurence Tribe and Eugene Gressman would be held in higher regard by 
the Justices than would non-academic counsel and that attorneys who 
argue for interest groups would enjoy a similar status. Thus, we predict:  
Law Professor Hypothesis: Law school professors who appear 
before the Court will garner higher grades than non–law school 
faculty. 
Amicus Attorney Hypothesis: Attorneys who participate at oral 
arguments on behalf of interest groups will garner higher grades at 
oral arguments. 
Finally, we assess whether Justice Blackmun’s evaluations are 
influenced by ideological considerations—namely, whether he gave better 
grades to lawyers advocating positions he preferred. Given the vast 
literature on Supreme Court decision making that argues ideology 
influences how Justices vote,67 we must ensure that his grading of 
attorneys was not tainted by ideological colors. This leads us to test the 
following:  
Ideological Compatibility Hypothesis: Attorneys who present 
arguments ideologically closer to Justice Blackmun are more likely 
to earn higher marks for their oral arguments. 
1. Data and Variables 
To test the above hypotheses, we analyze the grades Justice Blackmun 
assigned to attorneys during oral arguments in a random sample of 539 
cases decided between 1970 and 1994.68 These grades are located in 
 
 
 66. Id. at 156 (reporting that “[o]utside of Washington, the lawyers most likely to be held in high 
esteem are law professors and attorneys for organized interests”). 
 67. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9. 
 68. We used the docket number as our unit of analysis, and over this time period, the Court 
decided 3,755 cases with oral argument (full opinion, per curiam, judgment of the Court, or equally 
divided vote). Our data therefore represent about a 14% sample of the population of cases. Some of the 
evidence in this and the following part derive from Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck, & James F. 
Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 
(2006) [hereinafter Johnson et al.]. 
 Note that our data include nine cases where Justice Blackmun’s case file contained more than one 
set of oral argument notes due to a reargument. In our first model, we include the grades from both 
arguments, but in the outcome model, we obviously only include one observation for each Justice in 
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Blackmun’s oral argument notes in his personal papers at the Library of 
Congress. We examine the determinants of the grades Blackmun gave to 
each attorney in a case by regressing these grades on factors that act as 
proxies for the likely credibility of an attorney and the quality of the 
information presented. 
Using Justice Blackmun’s grades as a dependent variable requires us to 
consider two key issues. First, it is possible that the grades in Blackmun’s 
notes do not reflect his evaluation of the quality of the substantive 
arguments presented by the attorneys during oral arguments, and are 
simply based on the attorney’s rhetorical performance. Content analysis of 
Blackmun’s oral argument notes for 70 cases (13% of the sample) 
demonstrates that it is the former and not the latter. Specifically, we coded 
each sentence in his notes for these 70 cases to determine whether it 
discussed the substance of an attorney’s argument or the presentation style 
of that attorney. We found in these 70 cases that 95% (1,064) of the 
sentences in Blackmun’s notes discuss the attorneys’ substantive 
arguments, while only 5% (49) focus on stylistic comments about the 
presentation or on more general comments such as “bad argument.” These 
data overwhelmingly indicate that Blackmun was concerned about the 
substance of arguments.69 
The second issue we must confront is that Justice Blackmun’s grading 
system changed over the course of his tenure on the Court. He employed 
three different grading scales: A–F from 1970 to 1974; 1–100 from 1975 
to 1977; and 1–8 from 1978 to 1993 (see Figures 2a–2c for the frequency 
distribution of grades assigned to attorneys under each grading scheme).70 
 
 
each case, and we use the data on the reargument to measure the quality of the oral argumentation. The 
results for the outcome model do not change if we instead drop reargued cases from the analysis. 
 69. We cannot rule out the possibility that our measure of oral advocacy captures the influence of 
the written briefs. One would expect that lawyers making a good showing at oral arguments also 
penned high-quality written briefs. It is important to recognize, however, that even if the effect of 
written briefs is bleeding into our measure, we are still demonstrating the effect of attorneys on the 
legal process. 
 70. The three different scales have similar distributions, as seen in measures of skewness, which 
assesses the degree of asymmetry, and kurtosis, which assesses peakedness. A high kurtosis score 
indicates that a distribution has a steeper peak and fatter tails (i.e., there is relatively sparse data for 
larger values of the variable). A kurtosis of 3 represents a normal distribution; the A–F scale, 1–100 
scale, and 1–8 scale, respectively, have kurtosis scores of 3.4, 3.7, and 3.2. A skewness statistic tells us 
whether the distribution is symmetrical or whether it is skewed to the left (low values of the variable) 
or right (high values of the variable). The respective skewness statistics for these three scales are         
–0.39, 0.10, and 0.36. The negative value for the A–F scale indicates that a few more observations are 
at the low end of that scale, as compared to the other two. For a discussion of skewness and kurtosis, 
see generally CHARLES T. CLARK & LAWRENCE L. SCHKADE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS (1979).  
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For the A–F scale, the average grade (after converting it to a numeric 
scale) is 82.05 with a standard deviation of 5.88. The mean (and standard 
deviation) for the other two scales are respectively 77.36 (4.42) and 4.88 
(0.85). 
To compare Blackmun’s evaluations of attorneys across these three 
scales, we standardized the different grading schemes onto a common 
scale by determining how far away each grade was from the mean grade in 
that particular scale.71 More technically, we calculated a z-score for each 
grade, which tells us how many standard deviations a specific grade is 
from the mean grade in that scale.72 A score of 0 indicates that an 
attorney’s grade in a case equaled the mean grade for all of the attorneys in 
our sample for that scale. Larger positive scores indicate attorneys who 
scored higher than average on Blackmun’s scorecard, while negative 
values indicate they had lower than average scores. 
Because the z-scores are on a continuous scale, we estimated an OLS 
regression.73 Additionally, because an attorney may appear multiple times 
before the Court, we employed robust standard errors clustered on each 
attorney.74 We did so because while our data contain 1,118 observations, 
only 863 different attorneys argued before the Court. Thus, clustering in 
this manner allows for errors to be correlated within a particular attorney 
across different cases.75 Figures 2a–2c provide data on the nature of each 
grade scale. 
 
 
 71. To transform the alphanumeric scale into a numeric one, we converted an A to 95, an A- to 
90, a B+ to 87, a B to 85, a B- to 80, etc. Occasionally, Justice Blackmun assigned partial grades, 
specifically A-/B+, B-/C+, and C-/D; we transformed these to 89, 79, and 69, respectively.  
 72. We measured the z-score in the following way: (X – Mean) / Standard Deviation. See 
generally WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS (3d ed. 1981). By calculating the z-score for each grade 
based on the mean and standard deviation of the particular grading scheme from which it was drawn, 
we control for any changes in Justice Blackmun’s baseline grading propensity across the three scales. 
In other words, our approach does not require us to assume that an 85 under the first scale is equivalent 
to an 85 in the second or third scales. In addition, our results are not sensitive to how we precisely 
measure these grades. Indeed, the results are largely comparable if we linearly transform the 1–8 scale 
into a 0–100 scale. 
 73. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a statistical technique that determines the degree of linear 
association between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. For a discussion of OLS, 
see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 220 (3d ed. 1997). 
 74. One of the principal advantages of robust standard errors, also known as heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors or the Huber-White sandwich estimator, is that it can relax the assumption of 
independence across the observations in a data set. It can produce “correct” standard errors even if 
observations are correlated. See generally Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance 
Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980). 
 75. An alternative way to cluster would be on each case, which would allow the errors to be 
correlated across the different attorneys in the same case. This procedure is carried out in Stata 9.0 
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FIGURE 2A: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S 
EVALUATIONS OF ATTORNEYS’ ORAL ARGUMENTS, 1970–74 
 
 
 
using the following command at the end of the regression command: robust cl(lawyer_number). The 
results were largely the same when we clustered across cases rather than across attorneys. 
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FIGURE 2B: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S 
EVALUATIONS OF ATTORNEYS’ ORAL ARGUMENTS, 1975–77 
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FIGURE 2C: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S 
EVALUATIONS OF ATTORNEYS’ ORAL ARGUMENTS, 1978–94 
 
We included variables in our model to test each of the hypotheses 
discussed above. First, we included a measure of litigating experience 
based on McGuire’s definition of experience.76 Specifically, we coded the 
number of times an attorney previously appeared before the U.S. Supreme 
Court at oral arguments. We gathered these data through searches on 
Lexis/Nexis for each attorney’s name to determine past cases in which 
they appeared in this capacity. A case was only counted if the attorney in 
the present case was listed previously as having been the one to orally 
argue (being named on a brief does not count for this purpose). The 
number of prior appearances ranges 0–85 with a mean of 4 and a median 
of 0. To account for the skewed nature of these data (and to account for the  
 
 
 76. This measure of experience is well established in the literature. See, e.g., McGuire, Repeat 
Players, supra note 47; James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of 
Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365 (1997); Wahlbeck, supra note 12. 
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fact that a difference between appearing in 0 cases or 1 case is a bigger 
shift than the difference between appearing in 84 or 85 cases), we used the 
natural log of this count of appearances before the Court.77 This variable, 
labeled as Litigating Experience, has a mean of 0.702, a standard deviation 
of 1.08, and ranges between 0 and 4.45. 
Second, to determine whether the Solicitor General argued, we coded 
Justice Blackmun’s oral argument notes as well as the Court opinions in 
either Lexis/Nexis or FindLaw to determine whether an attorney had a 
title. Specifically, we looked for “Assistant Solicitor General” or “Solicitor 
General.” To account for the possibility that the Solicitor General is more 
successful before the Court than Assistant Solicitors General, we created 
two separate variables. First, if the attorney was the Solicitor General, we 
created a variable that is coded 1 (labeled Solicitor General in the table). 
For all other attorneys, this is coded 0. We created a similar variable for 
Assistant Solicitors General; if they argued then we coded Assistant 
Solicitor General as 1, while all other attorneys take on a value of 0. 
Solicitors General constitute 2.4% of the attorneys in our sample and 
Assistant Solicitors General account for 13.0% of the attorneys.78 
Next, we coded for whether the arguing attorney is from the federal 
government. It is coded 1 anytime the United States government is a party 
to the case and an attorney from the Solicitor General’s office is not the 
attorney of record. Specifically, we searched Lexis/Nexis for any instances 
where the United States is a party to the case and the Solicitor General or 
Assistant Solicitor General does not argue. For this variable, Federal 
Government Attorney, government attorneys are coded 1 and all other 
attorneys are coded 0. Approximately 12% of the attorneys in our sample 
represent the federal government but are not from the Solicitor General’s 
office. 
Beyond the experience and government status of attorneys, we 
obtained data on measures to test our other credibility hypotheses. We 
obtained data on whether an attorney attended an elite law school from 
Lexis/Nexis, Westlaw, or the Martindale Hubbell directory (the issue 
published during the year the case was argued). Attorneys who attended 
 
 
 77. The transformation of skewed variables is commonly used to help facilitate data analysis. 
Taking the natural log of a variable makes the variable more symmetrical in nature. Since the log of 0 
is undefined, we first added one to the number of prior appearances before the Court and then took its 
natural log. See JOHN FOX, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS, LINEAR MODELS, AND RELATED 
METHODS 60 fig.4.1 (1997). 
 78. This includes 46 cases where the Solicitor General argued as an amicus; this amounts to 
about 27% of the Solicitor General’s arguments. 
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one of the elite law schools (Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Chicago, 
Berkeley, Michigan, and Northwestern) are coded 1, while all other 
attorneys are coded 0.79 The mean value of Attorney Attended Elite Law 
School is 0.39 and the standard deviation is 0.49. 
We determined whether an attorney was a member of the Washington, 
D.C., Bar by coding the address for the arguing attorney as it appeared on 
the briefs submitted to the Court. If an address was found in Washington, 
D.C., excluding federal government attorneys, we coded Washington Elite 
as 1. All other attorneys are coded 0. About 11% of the attorneys in our 
sample were private attorneys from Washington D.C. 
We used the Martindale Hubbell directory for the year the case was 
argued, as well as the address listed on the briefs, to determine whether the 
arguing attorney was a law professor. If an attorney was listed as a 
professor at a law school, we coded Law Professor as 1, while all others 
are coded 0. Nearly 2% of attorneys arguing before the Court were law 
professors at the time. 
Sometimes the Court allows attorneys, beyond those representing the 
litigants, to appear at oral arguments on behalf of an interest group (as 
amicus curiae). If the attorney appeared in this capacity, we coded Interest 
Group as 1. All other attorneys are coded 0. Just over 1% of attorneys 
represented an interest group at oral arguments. 
Additionally, we obtained data from the clerk’s office at the U.S. 
Supreme Court to determine whether the arguing attorney served a Justice 
as a law clerk. The list includes all clerks who worked at the Court from 
1932 to 1991.80 We coded Former Law Clerk as 1 if an attorney had 
served in this capacity, and all others are coded 0. Nearly 7% of the 
attorneys in our sample previously worked as a clerk for one of the 
Justices. 
 
 
 79. Although there are annual rankings of law schools (see, e.g., U.S. News & World Report 
rankings at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/ 
lawrank_brief.php), there are no rankings of elite law schools that span the long period of time during 
which Supreme Court advocates in our sample were trained. While some may disagree with our 
identification of elite programs, the findings are not dependent on the exact specification of this 
variable. For example, we obtain the same result when we omit schools not routinely included in the 
recent top ten (e.g., University of California, Berkeley) or when we add schools that are ranked highly 
today (e.g., University of Virginia, New York University, Duke, and the University of Pennsylvania). 
 80. For a discussion of the quality of clerks, and the degree to which they are hot commodities 
once they leave the Court, see generally TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE 
RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. 
WEIDEN: SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2006). 
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Finally, we measured the ideological compatibility of the attorney’s 
position against Justice Blackmun’s. Using the ideological direction of the 
lower court decision (coded as either liberal or conservative),81 we 
determined whether an attorney represented the liberal or conservative 
position. For instance, if the lower court decision was liberal, then we 
coded the petitioner as advocating the conservative position at the Court 
and the respondent as putting forward the liberal position. Second, we 
employed Martin-Quinn scores to determine Blackmun’s year-to-year 
ideology over his entire Court career. Using a dynamic item response 
model with Bayesian inference, Martin and Quinn fit multivariate dynamic 
linear models to create measures of Justices’ ideologies for each year they 
sat on the bench.82 Larger values indicate that a Justice is more 
conservative. 
We matched our Justice-specific ideology measure with the ideological 
direction of the attorney’s argument, as described above. If an attorney 
argued for the liberal side in a case, we coded Ideological Compatibility as 
a transformed version of Justice Blackmun’s Martin-Quinn score; 
specifically, for these observations, we multiplied Justice Blackmun’s 
Martin-Quinn score by –1. Alternatively, if the attorney argued for the 
conservative side, we used Justice Blackmun’s Martin-Quinn score for this 
variable. Higher values therefore indicate that Blackmun is ideologically 
closer to the attorney’s position. This variable ranges between –1.9 and 
1.9, with a mean of 0.009 and a standard deviation of 1.06.  
In addition to our variables of interest, we included Appellant Attorney 
as a control. Because the Court is predisposed to reverse lower court 
 
 
 81. We draw these data from HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953–2005 TERMS, available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ 
ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). For a full discussion of how we define 
these outcomes, see id. at 52–55.  
 82. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) 
[hereinafter Martin & Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation]. One advantage of these scores is that 
they can, to some degree, capture change in a given Justice’s ideological position over time. Justice 
Blackmun’s move to the left is often discussed by academics and in the popular press. His ideological 
position moved from 1.86 in his first full year on the Court, which was the second most conservative 
score assigned to a Justice, to –1.81 in his last, which was the second most liberal score in 1993. See 
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php 
last visited Nov. 29, 2007. For a discussion of preference change on the Court, see Lee Epstein, 
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court 
Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 127 (2007); Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 
(2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/1
p457 Johnson Spriggs Wahlbeck book pages.doc1/22/08 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE INFLUENCE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 481 
 
 
 
 
decisions, we might expect Justice Blackmun to find petitioners’ 
arguments more favorable.83 Thus, we included a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when the attorney represents the petitioner, and 0 otherwise. In 
our sample of cases, the appellant won about 47.9% of the time. Finally, as 
a robustness check, we also included fixed effects for each Term of the 
Court (i.e., a dummy variable for each Term, with the 1970 Term excluded 
to serve as a baseline); the results reported in Table 1 are not appreciably 
different from the results with these additional control variables.  
2. The Correlates of Argumentation Quality 
We posit that attorneys with more litigating experience, better legal 
education and training, and greater reputational resources will receive 
higher evaluations because such attorneys will offer the Court more 
credible and compelling arguments than will less experienced or less 
resourceful attorneys.84 The results in Table 1, which were estimated in 
Stata 9.0, provide support for this expectation. Specifically, they show that 
any single measure of attorney credibility has a modest effect on their oral 
argument grades, but when one examines a set of these attorney 
characteristics, we observe considerable variation across the model’s 
predictions of the attorneys’ grades.  
TABLE 1: OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S 
ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF ORAL ARGUMENTATION BEFORE THE 
COURT (1970–94) 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Significance 
(one-tailed test)
Litigating 
Experience  
  0.262 0.051 0.000 
Solicitor General   0.370 0.218 0.050 
Assistant Solicitor 
General 
  0.102 0.118 0.190 
 
 
 83. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980); 
Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. 
CHOICE 387 (1982). 
 84. See McGuire, Repeat Players, supra note 47, at 189 (explaining that Justices have 
informational needs and that attorneys “have considerable incentive to provide candor in both their 
briefs and oral arguments”). 
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Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Significance 
(one-tailed test)
Federal Government 
Attorney 
  0.165 0.097 0.050 
Attorney Attended 
Elite Law School 
  0.209 0.066 0.001 
Washington Elite   0.401 0.106 0.000 
Law Professor   0.217 0.183 0.120 
Attorney Argues for 
Interest Group  
–0.163 0.253 0.520 
Former Law Clerk   0.276 0.119 0.010 
Ideological 
Compatibility with 
Attorney 
  0.051 0.025 0.020 
Appellant Attorney  –0.121 0.060 0.050 
Constant –0.317 0.058 0.000 
Number of 
Observations 
1118  
R2 
S.E.E. 
0.19 
0.90 
 
As predicted, attorneys with more prior experience litigating before the 
Court present better oral arguments. To determine how the coefficient of 
0.262 for Litigating Experience translates into points on the grade scale, 
we multiplied the coefficient by the standard deviation of the 
unstandardized grade variable on the 100-point scale, which is 6.28.85 
Doing so indicates that a one-unit change in this variable increases a 
lawyer’s grade by 1.6 points on the 100-point scale, and a lawyer who has 
the maximum level of experience in our data earns an average of 7 points 
more than those with the minimum experience. Additionally, attorneys 
from the U.S. government, especially those from the Solicitor General’s 
office, provided more compelling oral advocacy to Blackmun. When the 
Solicitor General personally argues, his grade is 2.3 points higher on the 
 
 
 85. Recall that the dependent variable in this regression analysis is a z-score, measuring the 
number of standard deviations an attorney’s grade is from the average grade among all attorneys. The 
coefficient of 0.262 for Litigating Experience thus indicates that a one-unit increase in this variable 
leads to a 0.262 standard deviation change to a lawyer’s grade. To make the regression coefficients 
more interpretable, we converted them back into the 100-point scale. 
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100-point scale that our reference category of attorneys located outside of 
Washington, D.C.86 Federal government attorneys not in the Solicitor 
General’s office do better, too, as they earn grades 1.0 point higher than 
those same non-Washington attorneys. 
Other factors of credibility also affect the quality of oral advocacy. For 
instance, attorneys who attended elite law schools earn grades 1.3 points 
higher than other attorneys.87 Additionally, because Washington insiders 
are seen as more credible by the Justices, they earn grades that are about 
2.5 points higher than attorneys outside Washington, D.C.88 Former 
Supreme Court clerks earn 1.7 points higher score than non-clerks. The 
two remaining variables that capture attorney characteristics—Law 
Professor and Attorney Argues for Interest Group—appear to be unrelated 
to their ability to offer better oral arguments. In addition, it is interesting 
that while the Court tends to take cases to reverse the lower court, 
attorneys arguing for appellants do not get higher grades. This provides 
some evidence that Justice Blackmun was not simply awarding higher 
grades to attorneys who were on the likely winning side of the case.  
Finally, we turn to our test of whether messages from attorneys who 
put forward arguments more compatible with Justice Blackmun’s 
ideological preferences will receive higher grades.89 The coefficient for 
 
 
 86. Our findings with respect to the two Solicitor General variables are somewhat confounded by 
collinearity with past litigating experience. The main statistical impact of collinearity between our 
variables is that our standard error estimates will be larger than they should be. This makes our 
variables less likely to be statistically significant. See FOX, supra note 77, at 337–52. The Solicitor 
General himself argued, on average, 34.1 previous cases, and the Assistant Solicitor General averaged 
14.9 prior arguments. In contrast, the average civilian attorney had appeared before the Court in only 
1.3 cases. If we omit the experience variable, Assistant Solicitor General as well as Solicitor General 
become statistically significant. The remaining variables are not overly contaminated by 
multicollinearity.  
 87. Some have argued that affiliations with law schools may communicate ideological 
information to the Court. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law 
Schools: An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315 
(1993). While some law schools have liberal or conservative reputations, alumni do not select cases 
strictly on ideological grounds. Our data on attorneys arguing before the Supreme Court reveal that 
graduates of Harvard and Yale, for instance, systematically represent parties on both sides of the 
ideological divide. 
 88. See MCGUIRE, supra note 47, at 183 (commenting that one benefit of representation by the 
elite Washington attorneys is “the reliability that the Court can assign to their judgment”). 
 89. If there is measurement error in our ideological distance variable, then Justice Blackmun’s 
evaluations of an attorney may be more heavily affected by ideological considerations than we report. 
We recognize that this measure is somewhat blunt, but current measurement technology does not offer 
a feasible alternative. Our proxy has been used in prior research. See Brian R. Sala & James F. 
Spriggs, II, Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197 
(2004). It is also analogous to a variable for the direction of the lower court decision because such a 
variable is a proxy for whether the petitioner sought a liberal or conservative Court outcome. See, e.g., 
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Ideological Compatibility with Attorney is appropriately signed and 
statistically distinguishable from no effect. Substantively, a one-unit 
increase in ideological compatibility resulted in a 0.32-point change in 
Blackmun’s evaluation of the attorney’s information when comparing 
attorneys transmitting information close to Blackmun with those who were 
more distant. When Blackmun was as ideologically distant from a litigant 
as possible, as compared to when he was ideologically aligned with a 
litigant, a lawyer’s score only increased by about 1.2 points. Thus, 
Blackmun’s evaluations of attorneys are not greatly influenced by his own 
ideological leanings.90 Importantly, this result indicates that our measure 
of oral argument quality is not overly tainted by Blackmun’s ideology, and 
thus it may appropriately be used to explain the other Justices’ final votes 
on the merits.91 
Combined, these findings suggest that the credibility of the attorney 
plays a role in Justice Blackmun’s grading scheme. Taking each variable 
in isolation, as we have done above, artificially diminishes the effect of 
credibility since attorney profiles usually comprise combinations of these 
attributes. Take, for instance, three hypothetical attorneys: a very credible 
 
 
McGuire, Repeat Players, supra note 47. While there is some amount of error in our measure, we take 
comfort in how well it performs in our model that explains each Justice’s final vote on the merits. In 
that model, our measure of ideological distance correlates highly with the Justices’ vote on the merits. 
Since we do not expect the effect of measurement error to be significantly larger for the model 
explaining Blackmun’s grades as compared to the one explaining votes, and since the measure of 
ideology works quite well in the model of votes, we infer that it is working reasonably well in the 
model explaining grades. In short, we do not think measurement error is masking any significant 
ideological bias in Blackmun’s grading. 
 90. We also measured ideology using Segal-Cover scores. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological 
Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995). The results are 
similar to those in Table 1. The advantage of the Martin-Quinn scores is that they vary over time, and 
conventional wisdom and the data indicate that Justice Blackmun became more liberal the longer he 
sat on the Court. See Martin & Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation, supra note 82, at 147–49. 
 91. There is a possibility that lawyers might pitch their arguments to the median Justice on the 
Court, which might lead Justice Blackmun to award attorneys higher grades when he occupied the 
median position. To investigate the possibility of strategic attorneys, we included a dummy variable in 
our analysis for whether Justice Blackmun assigned higher grades to attorneys when he was the 
median Justice on the Court (1978 and 1979) than in other years. These data do not indicate that he 
gave lawyers higher grades when he was the median Justice; and the other results in the model do not 
change when we include these variables. This result reinforces our finding for ideological distance by 
demonstrating that Blackmun did not give attorneys grades that were higher when they were likely 
pitching their arguments to him. Assessment of who was the median Justice is taken from Martin & 
Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, supra note 82, and is available in LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, 
HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS 
& DEVELOPMENTS 260–61 (CQ Press 2007) [hereinafter EPSTEIN ET AL.]. 
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Solicitor General; a private, but credible, Washington, D.C. attorney; and a 
less credible non-Washington attorney.92 The Solicitor General receives an 
average grade of 88.8, while the less credible, private, Washington 
attorney receives a score of 80.6. The less credible non-Washington 
attorney obtains a mark of 76.8. So, a credible attorney, like the Solicitor 
General, will receive a grade that is considerably higher than a less 
credible non-Washington counterpart.  
Importantly, this analysis indicates that Justice Blackmun’s evaluations 
are a reasonable measure of the quality of attorneys’ oral presentations. 
First, ideology has a small substantive effect on his grades, which is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the grades’ being a valid 
measure of argumentation quality. Second, these grades also evidence 
validity because they correlate with variables for attorney credibility and 
experience. Third, we did not see Blackmun manifest a tendency to give 
higher grades to appellants. This latter result further suggests that he was 
not simply awarding higher grades to the lawyer he thought was on the 
winning side. The next part offers a qualitative look at who earned the 
highest grades from Justice Blackmun. Following that, we demonstrate 
statistically that the quality of oral argumentation has a pronounced 
influence on the Justices’ final votes on the merits. 
3. Who Earned the Best Grades? 
The previous part demonstrates that various characteristics relating to 
attorneys’ professional training and work experience correlate with their 
performance at oral arguments. In this part, we take a qualitative look at 
who some of the premier advocates before the Court were.  
We begin with the early period—when Justice Blackmun assigned 
letter grades. Recall that the average attorney during this period received a 
B- (the numerical mean was 82.1% with a standard deviation of 5.9). 
However, 18 attorneys averaged an A- or better before the Court, and four 
 
 
 92. We gave the Solicitor General the following attributes: the maximum value of experience for 
Solicitors General, past law clerk experience, and graduation from an elite law school. The private 
Washington attorney was given the following characteristics: average experience of a Washington-
based attorney, attendance at an elite law school, but not a Supreme Court clerk. The less credible non-
Washington attorney had no prior Supreme Court experience, did not attend an elite law school, and 
was not a Supreme Court clerk. We held ideology constant at its mean of 0 for each attorney type. To 
calculate the expected grade level, we multiplied the product of each coefficient and the standard 
deviation on the 100-point grade scale (6.28) by the designated value. We then added the mean of the 
unstandardized grade (78.8) and the regression constant to this product to arrive at the expected grade. 
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others averaged a high B+.93 Many of the names on this list will be 
familiar to Court watchers, from Deputy Solicitor General Daniel 
Friedman and Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, to future Judge E. Barrett 
Prettyman, Jr. and notable lawyer and legal scholar, Charles Alan Wright. 
One of the consistently best advocates to appear before the Court during 
this period was Deputy Solicitor General Friedman. In his 9 appearances 
as Deputy Solicitor General in our sample, he averaged a grade of A/A-
(92.9 on the numeric scale). Indeed, he received a grade lower than an A 
(a B+) on only one occasion. His expertise is also evidenced by the fact 
that, in his two post–Solicitor General appearances before the Court, he 
earned an A and a B+ from Blackmun.  
Other experienced attorneys also fared well before the Court during 
this period. Archibald Cox (some years after he left his position as 
Solicitor General) earned an A-/B+ as well as a B (both well above 
average grades from Blackmun). Similarly, Joseph Califano (who had 
previously served as an advisor to President Johnson and later served as 
Secretary of Health and Human Services under President Jimmy Carter) 
earned an A- on 3 occasions and a B+ in 1 appearance. 
We see a similar pattern when Justice Blackmun began to use his 100-
point scale (1975 to 1977, when the mean score was 77.4 with a standard 
deviation of 4.4). Solicitors General still seemed to fare the best, though 
there was more variance in their grades. For instance, Deputy Solicitor 
General Randolph earned grades of 85 and 83 but also earned an 80 and a 
76. Further, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman earned an 83, while 
Deputy Lawrence Wallace earned an 81 and an 80. Other government 
attorneys did not perform as well. Deputy Solicitor General Andrew L. 
Frey only earned a 75, and Assistant Attorney General Peter R. Taft 
earned the lowest grade during this time period—a 39. 
Among non-government attorneys, former Solicitor General Griswold 
was still among the cream of the crop. In two cases argued during the 1977 
Term, he earned a 95 and an 87. Other “big-name” attorneys appear to 
have given average arguments according to Justice Blackmun. E. Barrett 
Prettyman earned an 80 for an argument during the 1976 Term, while 
Frank Easterbrook earned an 80 in 1975. 
Remember that during the final time period (1978–94), Justice 
Blackmun turned to his 8-point scale (the mean score was 4.9 with a 
 
 
 93. Note that we calculated the average grade for each attorney by averaging all the grades they 
received within a particular grading regime. 
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standard deviation of 0.9). Again, Solicitors General performed quite well. 
Indeed, Solicitor General Wade H. McCree earned two 7s (note that only 
one attorney received the highest grade of 8, so a 7 is quite good), 
Solicitor General Rex Lee earned a 6 and two 5s, and Solicitor General 
Kenneth Starr earned two 6s. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace earned a 
series of 7s and 6s in addition to an average 5, and Deputy Solicitor 
General Stephen Shapiro earned a 7.  
There was also a wide range for private attorneys. While the median 
grade for private attorneys was 0.37 standard deviations below the mean 
grade for all attorneys, their grades varied from a low of 3.39 standard 
deviations below the mean to a high of 3.98 standard deviations above the 
mean. At the high end are private lawyers such as Laurence Tribe (who 
was also a law professor at the time), who earned a 7 and 7/6; Moses 
Lasky, who earned an A; and S. Hazard Gillespie, who was awarded a 7. 
The lowest score of this time period was a 2 earned in 1981 by Robert M. 
Beno, who was a private attorney working outside Washington, D.C., and 
without any prior experience arguing before the Court.  
The point for us is that the grades of those who did well in their 
appearances match our expectations quite well. Indeed, Solicitors General, 
former clerks, other attorneys working for the federal government, private 
attorneys working in Washington, D.C., and those having previously 
argued before the Court (all proxies for experience and credibility) seem to 
earn the best grades when arguing before the Court. These anecdotes help 
illustrate the general tendencies that we reported in the previous part. 
4. Supreme Court Justices Before the Bench 
Four of the current Supreme Court Justices appeared during Justice 
Blackmun’s tenure on the Court, and one former Justice appeared. As is 
the case with other attorneys who argued, these Justices’ grades varied. 
Two Justices argued once each. After he left the bench, Justice Arthur 
Goldberg was tapped to argue on behalf of Curt Flood in Flood v. Kuhn.94 
He earned an above-average grade of 81 on Blackmun’s 100-point scale, 
but lost the case. Justice Antonin Scalia argued one case, Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Cuba,95 prior to his elevation to the Court, and he earned 
an 85, placing him in the top 2.4% of attorneys who argued during this 
 
 
 94. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 95. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
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time period. While he was arguing as amicus curiae, his side won a 
reversal.  
Three Justices argued multiple cases prior to their service on the bench: 
Justice Alito, Justice Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Roberts. According to 
Justice Blackmun, both Roberts and Alito were average advocates during 
this time. Prior to becoming Chief Justice, Roberts argued 20 cases, and 
earned grades from Blackmun in twelve of them.96 He earned a 6 on one 
occasion, four times earned a 4/5, and earned a 5 in the other seven times 
he appeared. Blackmun did not seem to think he was an exceptional 
advocate, as is evidenced in his oral argument notes for Freytag v C.I.R.,97 
in which he wrote: “6, better than usual.” Chief Justice Roberts’s grades 
were average for attorneys, and his mean score of 4.8 was equal to the 
mean for all attorneys during this period. Justice Alito fared a bit better. In 
twelve arguments he earned three 6s, seven 5s, and two 4s.98 His mean 
grade was slightly above average—a 5.08. Overall, neither of these two 
Justices was statistically different from the average advocate. Indeed, in a 
difference of means test, Justice Alito’s and Chief Justice Roberts’s grades 
were indistinguishable from the mean grade. 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice Ginsburg 
took a more typical path for those who appear multiple times before the 
Court. While she earned a C+ at her first appearance, she earned two B’s 
thereafter, and in her final argument in our sample, she earned an above-
average 6.99  
 
 
 96. Blackmun assigned grades to Roberts in the following cases: 5 in Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); 4/5 in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
511 U.S. 863 (1994); 5 in Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); 5 in Withrow v. Williams, 
507 U.S. 680 (1993); 5 in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); 5 in Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); 5 in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); 5 in Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); 4/5 in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 
491 (1989).  
 97. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 98. Blackmun assigned grades to Alito in the following cases: 5 in Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 
115 (1985); 6 in Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451 
(1985); 5 in Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); 4 in United 
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); 5 in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984); 5 
in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); 6 in Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16 (1983); 5 in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); 5 in Cmty. Television 
of So. Cal. V. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983); 4 in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); 5 in 
Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728 (1982); 5 in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 
(1982).  
 99. Blackmun recorded grades for Ginsburg in the following cases: 6 in Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357 (1979); 80 in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); B in Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 
772 (1975); B in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); B in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 
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B. Does the Quality of Oral Argument Affect the Final Votes on the 
Merits? 
Although it is important to understand how Justice Blackmun evaluated 
arguments, as well as who earned which grades, this does not answer 
whether the quality of lawyers’ oral arguments affected the likelihood that 
Justices will vote for the clients they represent. By taking this next step, 
we are able to draw a direct link between the information attorneys present 
and the Justices’ votes.100 
Before proceeding, however, we must discuss our focus in this part. 
Clearly, the hypotheses in the previous part are directed at Justice 
Blackmun’s behavior. We cannot, however, simply regress Blackmun’s 
votes on his evaluation of the attorneys’ arguments because of the inherent 
endogeneity we would face. That is, it is possible that Blackmun assigned 
higher grades to litigants for whom he anticipated voting. While the data 
analysis in the prior parts shows that Blackmun’s ideological leanings 
played a small role in his grading of attorneys, we nonetheless want to do 
everything possible to rule out this possible bias. As such, we need to find 
another way to test whether votes are affected by the quality of oral 
arguments, as indicated by Blackmun’s grading of attorneys. While there 
are several solutions, we chose to examine the influence of oral arguments 
on all of Blackmun’s colleagues, thereby excluding him from the 
analysis.101 In so doing, we ameliorate the endogeneity issue that would 
arise if we only analyzed Blackmun’s votes. In fact, to the extent that there 
is endogeneity, it should stack the deck against finding an effect for 
Justices other than Blackmun—especially for those Justices who are 
 
 
(1974); C+ in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 100. Unlike the model that allows us to explain the grades attorneys earned, where we included all 
attorneys who received a grade, we excluded from this analysis cases where Justice Blackmun did not 
assign a grade to both the appellant’s and appellee’s attorney. We did so because we must compare 
both attorneys’ grades to assess the effect of oral advocacy on the Justices’ votes. One reason he may 
have failed to give grades in a particular case is that he may not have been fully engaged with the 
argument. For instance, in Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Movers, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, 
Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526 (1984), Blackmun did not assign a grade to Mark 
D. Stern, the respondent’s attorney. He wrote in his notes, “I am sleepy and dosed [sic] off. Hope I was 
not observed by spectators or Rehnquist [who sat next to Blackmun].” Oral Argument Notes from 
Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 9, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
 101. Another way around this problem would have been to examine Justice Blackmun’s votes 
through the use of an instrumental variable regression. But this approach requires us to find one or 
more variables that are highly correlated with the quality of oral argumentation but uncorrelated with 
Justice Blackmun’s vote in the case. We currently have no such variables that meet these criteria. For 
an introduction to instrumental variable models (also called simultaneous equation models), see, e.g., 
GREENE, supra note 73, at 288–95. 
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ideologically at odds with him. With this in mind, we turn to our case 
outcome hypotheses. 
First, if oral arguments are integral for the Court, Justices’ decisions 
should be affected by the quality of arguments presented during these 
proceedings. Indeed, if the Justices find information from some attorneys 
more credible and therefore more reliable, the Justices should be more apt 
to use that information when deciding how to act. Thus, we hypothesize 
that: 
Oral Argument Hypothesis: Justices are more likely to vote for the 
litigant whose attorney provides better oral arguments.  
Second, the dominant explanation within the literature on judicial 
behavior emphasizes the role of policy preferences in decision making. 
Judicial politics scholars have argued for decades that Court decisions are 
influenced by the Justices’ policy views.102 While some have asserted that 
policy preferences alone explain decisions,103 others have maintained that 
maximization of policy goals is preeminent.104 While these scholars 
disagree on the extent to which policy preferences dominate, it has become 
clear that policy preferences affect Justices’ decisions at various stages of 
this process: agenda setting,105 opinion writing,106 and decisions on the 
merits.107 Thus, we expect that: 
Policy Preference Hypothesis: Justices are more likely to side with 
the attorney whose position is closer to their personal policy 
preferences. 
In addition to their independent effects, these two variables may be 
conditionally related to one another. If Justices principally pursue policy-
related goals but are constrained by the bounds of the law, one might 
expect the effect of ideological proximity to be conditioned by the quality 
of legal argument.108 Similarly, Justices who are ideologically closer to a 
 
 
 102. See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–1947 (1948); DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT 
DECISION MAKING (1976); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9.  
 103. See generally ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 102; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9. 
 104. See generally EPSTEIN &  KNIGHT, supra note 9; MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9. 
 105. See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988). 
 106. See generally MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9. 
 107. See generally Segal & Cover, supra note 90. 
 108. See generally EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9; LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992); HANSFORD & 
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litigant’s position are likely to be influenced more strongly by the quality 
of the oral advocacy presented on his or her behalf. Even though we 
expect the quality of arguments to affect all Justices across the ideological 
spectrum, information may have a stronger effect when a Justice is 
ideologically compatible with the attorney presenting the arguments. In 
short, the effect of one of these variables, either oral advocacy or a 
Justice’s policy preference, will depend on the level of the other variable. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
The Conditional Effect of Oral Advocacy Hypothesis: Justices who 
are ideologically closer to an attorney’s position will be influenced 
more strongly by the quality of oral argumentation than Justices 
who are ideologically farther from that attorney’s position. 
Likewise, the positive relationship between a Justice’s ideological 
proximity to a litigant and his or her voting for that litigant will be 
weaker when the opposing counsel provides more compelling 
arguments.  
Beyond the key factors of ideological proximity and credibility, it is 
likely that the influence of oral argumentation may be linked to a Justice’s 
level of information about a case. In some instances, the Justices’ need for 
information will be higher, and an attorney who provides credible 
information should be positioned to have more of an effect on the outcome 
of the case; in the event of an informational void, Justices are most likely 
to be swayed by attorneys’ arguments. In relation to oral arguments, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist indicates that these proceedings sometimes help 
alleviate the information deficit: “I find that [oral arguments influencing 
my view of a case] is most likely to occur in cases involving areas of the 
law with which I am least familiar.”109 
While a number of factors may indicate that Justices need additional 
information to decide a case, one of the most pertinent factors is when a 
highly complex set of legal issues is present.110 In fact, cases that come to 
the Supreme Court often focus on several issues, as well as on more than 
one constitutional or statutory question. It is these cases where lawyers, 
who often spend years researching a case, have more information than 
they can relay to the Justices through briefs. Because of the need for 
 
 
SPRIGGS, supra note 9. 
 109. REHNQUIST, supra note 8, at 276. 
 110. See generally MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9; Bailey et al., supra note 49. 
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information in complex cases, Justices should be more receptive to high-
quality arguments.111 This expectation leads us to predict that: 
The Conditional Effect of Information Need Hypothesis: The effect 
of oral arguments on Justices is conditional on the complexity of the 
case under consideration, meaning that oral arguments will have a 
greater influence in cases of greater complexity. 
Additionally, it is possible that the effect of oral arguments is 
conditional on the salience of a case for the Justices. Baum argues that oral 
arguments may have more of an effect in cases that are less salient than 
other cases because, presumably, Justices’ preferences are less rigid in 
cases about which they care less.112 Additionally, politically salient cases 
have richer information environments, and as a result, the Justices have a 
better understanding of important case attributes that influence their 
decision making—such as the location of the status quo policy, the 
available alternative policies in the case, and the relationship between 
those alternatives and their preferences over distributional outcomes.113 
Thus we hypothesize that: 
The Conditional Effect of Case Salience Hypothesis: The effect of 
oral arguments is conditional on the level of case salience, meaning 
that oral arguments will matter less in salient cases. 
1. Data and Variables 
To evaluate the extent to which the quality of oral arguments affects 
the Justices’ decisions, we examined whether each Justice, excluding 
Blackmun, voted to reverse the lower court decision using the same 
sample of cases as in the previous analysis of attorneys’ grades (a random 
 
 
 111. Case complexity should affect the extent to which the Justices take oral advocacy into 
consideration, as manifested in their votes, but it should not affect Justice Blackmun’s evaluation of 
the quality of oral argument. Thus, we include case complexity in the vote model but not in 
Blackmun’s evaluation of attorney arguments. For case complexity to affect Blackmun’s evaluation of 
attorneys, he would have to evaluate all attorneys arguing in complex cases more (or less) than 
attorneys in noncomplex cases. Instead we argue that Justices, facing informational asymmetry, will 
weigh highly credible information more heavily. The results in Table 2, however, do not differ much if 
we also include the complexity variable.  
 112. Lawrence Baum, Symposium on Oral Argument, 5 LAW & CTS. 4 (1995). 
 113. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity 
on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996). 
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sample of 539 cases from 1970–94). Using Spaeth,114 we coded votes to 
reverse as 1 and votes to affirm as 0. Justices voted to reverse the lower 
court in 57.3% of the observations. Because the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, we estimated a logistic regression model.115  
The key independent variable in our model, Oral Argument Grade, is 
derived from the grades Justice Blackmun assigned to each attorney 
during oral arguments. Specifically, we created a variable that compares 
the grades of the attorneys arguing each case. We did so by subtracting the 
appellee’s grade, as measured by the z-score discussed above, from the 
appellant’s grade. Larger values on this variable therefore indicate the 
appellant had the stronger oral argument.116 This variable ranges from       
–4.50 to 4.51, with a mean of –0.11 and standard deviation of 1.05. 
To control for a Justice’s Ideological Compatibility with Appellant, we 
created a variable similar to Ideological Compatibility with Attorney, 
containing the Martin-Quinn score117 of each Justice who sat during the 
timespan covered by our sample. We first determined the ideological 
direction of both the petitioner and respondent based on Spaeth’s118 
measure of the ideological direction of the lower court decision. If the 
lower court made a liberal ruling, we assumed that the petitioner sought a 
conservative outcome and the respondent a liberal outcome from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. We then matched the Martin-Quinn measure (for which a 
larger, positive score indicates that a Justice is more conservative) with the 
ideological direction of argument we expected an attorney to make. If an 
attorney argued for the liberal side during a Term, we multiplied a 
Justice’s Martin-Quinn score by –1. Alternatively, if the attorney argued 
for the conservative side, we coded it as the Justice’s Martin-Quinn score. 
Larger values on this variable thus indicate that a Justice is ideologically 
 
 
 114. SPAETH, supra note 81. 
 115. The logistic regression model (also commonly referred to as the “logit model”) and its close 
relative, the probit model, are nonlinear models used when the dependent variable of interest is a 
binary (also known as “dichotomous” or “dummy”) variable. Conceptually, its purpose is no different 
than the OLS (linear regression) model, see supra note 73; that is, it seeks to explain variation in the 
dependent variables given a set of independent variables. See, e.g., J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION 
MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997). 
 116. If more than one attorney argued on a side, which happens occasionally, we used the average 
of the grades earned by the attorneys on that side. The results do not differ if we instead use the 
maximum grade earned by the attorneys. 
 117. Martin & Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation, supra note 82. Martin and Quinn do not 
calculate an ideological score for a Justice in the last year of service on the Court, and for those Justice 
observations (n = 90), we used the Justice’s ideological score for the previous year.  
 118. SPAETH, supra note 81. 
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closer to the attorney’s position. This variable ranges from –6.15 to 6.15, 
with a mean of 0.047 and standard deviation of 2.54.  
We are also interested in whether there is a conditional effect between 
Oral Argument Grade and a Justice’s ideological compatibility with an 
attorney. We therefore included a multiplicative variable119 of these two 
variables (Ideological Compatibility * Oral Argument Grade). We expect 
this variable to have a positive coefficient, which would indicate that the 
positive effect of Ideological Compatibility increases as an attorney’s 
arguments grow more persuasive. It would also show that the effect of 
Oral Argument Grade is larger if a Justice is ideologically more proximate 
to the position of an attorney. 
To measure the complexity of a case, we conducted a factor analysis120 
of the number of legal provisions in a case and the number of issues 
involved for all cases decided by the Supreme Court between the 1946 and 
1999 Terms.121 Using Spaeth,122 we counted the number of legal issues 
and the number of legal provisions at issue in a case. The factor analysis 
resulted in a single factor with an eigenvalue greater than one.123 We 
assigned the factor score that resulted from this analysis for each case. The 
average Case Complexity is –0.009 with a standard deviation of 0.39, and 
it ranges from –0.53 and 1.96. To test our hypothesis that the Justices will 
give more weight to oral arguments in complex cases, we included an 
 
 
 119. Multiplicative variables, also known as interactive terms, allow researchers to test hypotheses 
that the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable is actually conditioned by a 
second independent variable. In our case, the interactive term evaluates how a Justice’s ideological 
proximity to a litigant alters the effect of a high or low grade on the likelihood that the Justice votes to 
reverse. On the use (and misuse) of interactive terms, see Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & 
Matt Golder, Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63 
(2006); Robert J. Friedrich, In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations, 26 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 787 (1982). 
 120. Factor analysis, as used in this context, is a data-reduction technique that uses the correlation 
among two or more observed variables of interest to produce a single variable, which is assumed to be 
a latent unobservable quantity and a linear function of the observed (or manifest) variables. See JAE-
ON KIM & CHARLES W. MUELLER, INTRODUCTION TO FACTOR ANALYSIS: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO 
DO IT (1978). In our case, we use factor analysis to model case complexity as an unobservable variable 
with manifestations in number of legal provisions and number of issues involved in a given case.  
 121. This measure, or a variation on it, is used widely in the literature. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET 
AL., supra note 9; MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9; Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An 
Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent 64 J. POL. 
534 (2002); Valerie Hoekstra & Timothy R. Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court’s Decision 
to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. RES. Q. 351 (2003). 
 122. SPAETH, supra note 81. 
 123. Selecting factors with eigenvalues only greater than 1 conforms to the Kaiser-Guttman rule 
and is widely employed in factor analysis models. See, e.g., TIMOTHY A. BROWN, CONFIRMATORY 
FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR APPLIED RESEARCH 26–27 (2006). 
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interaction term,124 Oral Argument Grade * Case Complexity. A positive 
coefficient on this interaction variable would indicate that the 
effectiveness of oral arguments is greater for cases that are more complex. 
For political salience, we used Epstein and Segal’s dichotomous 
variable that measures whether an account of the case appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times.125 For our sample of cases, 16.0% of 
them were reported on the front page of the New York Times. To test 
whether the influence of the relative quality of the lawyers’ oral arguments 
is conditional on case salience, we included the interaction term126 
between those two variables, Oral Argument Grade * Case Salience. A 
negative coefficient on this interaction term would be consistent with our 
claim and show that oral arguments matter less in cases of higher salience. 
2. Do Oral Arguments Affect the Justices’ Votes? 
The results in Table 2 show that the Justices do indeed respond to the 
quality of oral argumentation.127 To ensure that our estimation of the 
magnitude of oral argument’s influence on a Justice's vote is not capturing 
the effect of other factors, we include a number of control variables as 
discussed above. Column two of Table 2 reports the results for the effect 
of oral argumentation without these control variables, and column three 
reports the results with all of the control variables included. Even when 
controlling for the most compelling alternative explanation—a Justice’s 
ideology—and accounting for other factors affecting Court outcomes, the 
oral argument grades correlate highly with the Justices’ final votes on the 
merits.128 This relationship is illustrated with the substantive results of this 
 
 
 124. See supra note 119. 
 125. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000). We 
realize that this measure of salience is ex post because it measures salience only after cases are 
decided. Because we believe our model would not be specified correctly without a measure of political 
salience, we still choose to include it. 
 126. See supra note 119. 
 127. By excluding Justice Blackmun, we decrease the possibility that the oral argument measure is 
tainted by Blackmun’s anticipated position in the case. While our first empirical model shows that 
Blackmun’s grading of attorneys was largely not influenced by his ideological orientation, we 
nonetheless think it best to exclude him from this analysis. If we include him in the analysis, however, 
the results do not change. In addition, the number of observations in Table 2 is slightly larger (by 90 
observations) than the analysis in Johnson et al., supra note 68, because we filled in some previously 
missing data.  
 128. It is possible that attorneys get higher grades in cases in which they have the “better” legal 
position, and thus the relationship we show here could reflect the effect of the legal and factual 
circumstances of a case. We think that the effect is more plausibly a function of attorney arguments 
than case facts. First, cases that are placed on the Court’s docket and decided with an opinion are by 
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model. When all the independent variables are held at their mean values 
(or modal value for a categorical variable), there is a 59.2% chance that a 
Justice will vote to reverse. If we set the value of Oral Argument Grade at 
one standard deviation above its mean, indicating that the appellant’s 
attorney offered a higher quality argument, then this probability increases 
to 65.0%.129 The difference is seen more clearly as the quality of 
competing counsel diverges; when the appellant’s attorney is manifestly 
better than the appellee’s attorney, there is an 81.4% chance that a Justice 
will vote for the petitioner, while this likelihood decreases to 32.9% when 
the appellee’s attorney is clearly better.130 This statistical result confirms 
our argument that the relative quality of the competing attorneys’ oral 
arguments influences the Justices’ votes on the merits.131 
 
 
their very nature difficult ones that do not result in one litigant clearly having the better side of the 
case. Additionally, all of the existing accounts of fact patterns are only able to focus on one issue area 
in their analyses. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Mark J. Richards & Bert Kritzer, Jurisprudential 
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002); Jeffrey Segal, 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962–1981, 78 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891 (1984). Extending such an approach to an analysis of all issue areas before the 
Court would be inherently difficult. We are willing to bear the cost of not including facts in our 
analysis so that we can produce an analysis for the role of oral arguments that is generalizable across 
issue areas. Nonetheless, we did attempt to test for this possibility in this model by using certiorari 
(cert) votes. Our intuition is that cases with unanimous cert votes should indicate that the appellant has 
a strong case, while minimum winning cert coalitions should indicate a case in which the litigants have 
more equally balanced legal and factual claims. The data do not offer much support for either idea; for 
example, unanimous cert coalitions do not lead to the appellant’s lawyer receiving a higher grade or 
the appellant winning more often. These data indicate, however, that appellants are less likely to win 
when there is a minimum winning cert coalition. We also tested whether the “closeness” of a case 
might affect the measure of argument quality. To do so, we included variables for whether there was a 
dissent in the lower court or conflict among the lower courts. In the grade model, grades are not 
affected by either lower court dissents or conflict. In the outcome model, a Justice is less likely to vote 
for the appellant if the Court granted certiorari to resolve a lower court conflict. However, lower court 
dissents have no effect on how a Justice votes. Importantly, our variables of interest do not change 
with the inclusion of any of the aforementioned variables controlling for case facts or the closeness of 
a case. 
 129. The predicted probabilities are based on the model with all of the control variables (column 3 
in Table 2). Also, we set all other variables at their mean (or mode for a categorical variable), and we 
set each interaction term at the product of the values of its two component terms.  
 130. We set the Oral Argument Grade variable at its maximum and minimum values in this 
example, holding everything else constant at the mean (mode for a categorical variable). 
 131. The effect of Oral Argument Grade is not influenced much by how we estimate the model. 
However, the effect of the interaction term, Ideological Compatibility * Oral Argument Grade, is 
somewhat less stable. If we attempt to control for potential heteroskedasticity in ways other than we 
used in Table 2 (robust standard errors clustered on Justice), Oral Argument Grade’s coefficient and 
confidence interval remain largely similar but the results for the interaction terms differ. See, supra 
note 74 for a description of robust standard errors. If we use a logit model with robust standard errors 
clustered on Court cases (and include fixed effects for the Justices), then the interaction terms for 
Ideological Compatibility * Oral Argument Grade (p = .12) and Oral Argument Grade * NYT (p = .09) 
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TABLE 2: LOGIT ESTIMATES OF THE JUSTICES’ PROPENSITY TO REVERSE A 
LOWER COURT’S DECISION (1970–94) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard 
Error)  
Oral Argument Grade  
Ideological  
0.296 (.051)* 
 
0.232 (.046)* 
 
Compatibility with 
Appellant 
0.304 (.040)* 0.315 (.041)* 
Case Complexity  0.032 (.055) 0.037 (.068) 
Case Salience –0.189 (.101) –0.130 (.101) 
Ideological 
Compatibility * Oral 
Argument Grade  
0.027 (.006)* 
 
0.028 (.006)* 
 
Oral Argument Grade * 
Case Complexity 
–0.135 (.090) 
 
–0.130 (.085) 
 
Oral Argument Grade * 
Case Salience 
–0.246 (.058)* –0.209 (.068)* 
Control Variables   
U.S. Appellant --- 0.466 (.104)* 
U.S. Appellee --- –0.750 (.098)* 
S.G. Appellant --- 0.388 (.108)* 
S.G. Appellee --- –0.220 (.136) 
Washington Elite 
Appellant 
--- 0.377 (.103)* 
Washington Elite 
Appellee 
--- 0.089 (.129) 
Law Professor Appellant --- –0.740 (.156) 
Law Professor Appellee --- –1.602 (.226)* 
 
 
are not significant, though the coefficients have the correct sign. If we use a heteroskedastic probit 
model (where heteroskedasticity is allowed to be in the oral argument grade variable), then the data 
suggest that the influence of oral arguments does not increase as the Justice becomes ideologically 
closer to the litigant’s position, but the influence of oral argument is conditional on the salience of a 
case. If we use a logit model with robust standard errors that are not clustered on Justices, then the 
results are similar to those reported in Table 3. Finally, if we run these models without the interaction 
term, Oral Argument Grade remains positive and statistically significant. Importantly, in all of the 
above discussed models, the Oral Argument Grade variable remains positive and statistically 
significant. 
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Variable 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard 
Error)  
Former Clerk Appellant --- –0.236 (.094) 
Former Clerk Appellee --- –0.171 (.198) 
Elite Law School 
Appellant 
--- 0.040 (.114) 
Elite Law School 
Appellee 
--- –0.135 (.083) 
Difference in Litigating 
Experience 
--- –0.137 (.012) 
Constant 0.387 (.049)* 0.420 (.042)* 
Number of Observations 3421 3421 
Log Likelihood –2107.14 –2047.87 
*p ≤ 0.01 (one-tailed test) 
One might wonder whether this finding is an artifact of Justices being 
more responsive to arguments provided by lawyers who advocate 
positions consistent with their policy preferences. We can definitively 
state that this is not the case. Our data show that the effect of the 
difference between the petitioner’s and respondent’s oral argument quality 
varies with the Justice’s ideological support of the lawyer’s position. 
Nevertheless, even though the impact of oral arguments is statistically 
different depending on the Justice’s ideological predilections, the effect of 
Oral Argument Grade is positive and statistically significant through 
nearly the entire range of Ideological Compatibility.132 Thus, even Justices 
who are ideologically opposed to the position advocated by a lawyer have 
an increased probability of voting for that side of the case if the lawyer 
provides a higher quality oral argument than the opposing counsel. The 
magnitude of this effect is sizeable, as Figure 3 indicates. It demonstrates 
that nearly all Justices are influenced by the quality of oral arguments, but 
 
 
 132. Oral Argument Grade is statistically significant for 97.5% of the data, and remains positive, 
but not significant, for values of Ideological Compatibility with Appellant less than –5.6. Specifically, 
we cannot rule out the null hypothesis that the oral argument grades do not matter for Justice Douglas 
when lawyers represent litigants advocating conservative outcomes. This result does not indicate that 
ideologically distant Justices are never influenced by the quality of oral arguments. The data, for 
example, do show that when Justices such as Rehnquist, Brennan, or Marshall encounter a litigant 
advocating a position with which they ideologically disagree, they are influenced by the quality of oral 
argumentation.  
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those Justices who are ideologically closer to a lawyer’s position have an 
enhanced tendency to support that lawyer if he or she presents better oral 
advocacy than does the opposing counsel. In short, oral advocacy has a 
generally large and robust effect on the way in which Supreme Court 
Justices vote. 
FIGURE 3: THE EFFECT OF ORAL ADVOCACY CONDITIONAL ON JUSTICE 
IDEOLOGY133 
 
For instance, consider a Justice who is ideologically opposed to the 
petitioner (specifically, a Justice who is one standard deviation below the 
mean on Ideological Compatibility with Appellant). This Justice has a 
35.6% chance of supporting the petitioner when the respondent presents 
oral advocacy that is considerably better than the petitioner’s. By contrast, 
the likelihood of voting for the petitioner’s position increases to 43.8% 
when this Justice encounters a petitioner who outmatches the respondent’s 
attorney at oral arguments.134 As seen in Figure 3, the magnitude of the 
 
 
 133. Quality of Oral Argumentation represents the difference between the quality of oral advocacy 
by the appellant’s and appellee’s attorneys, with larger scores indicating that the appellant presented 
better arguments. Note that for this figure and for Figure 4, the cases included are only those that are 
not on the front page of the New York Times (as per our measure of salience). 
 134. We set the value of Oral Argument Grade one standard deviation above its mean when the 
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effect of oral advocacy is even more pronounced for Justices who are 
ideologically supportive of the attorney with the stronger oral argument. 
When the Justice favors the appellant ideologically but the appellee offers 
more credible arguments, the Justice has a 70.0% chance of voting for the 
appellant; when the appellant provides better oral arguments, then this 
percentage increases to 81.6%. 
Let us now consider the effect of the ideological distance between a 
Justice and a litigant. Holding other variables constant at their means (or 
modes for categorical variables), a one-standard deviation shift from 
below to above the mean of Ideological Compatibility with Appellant 
alters the probability of a Justice voting to reverse from 0.396 to 0.763. 
Figure 4 provides a graphical depiction of the influence of ideological 
distance, conditional on the difference in the quality of the attorneys’ oral 
arguments. It shows that the ideological distance between a Justice and a 
litigant has a pronounced influence on a Justice’s vote.  
As we predicted, the effect of ideological distance is also conditioned 
by the relative quality of the attorneys’ oral advocacy. For instance, 
consider a Justice who is supportive of the petitioner’s position 
(Ideological Compatibility with Appellant = 3). Under this scenario, when 
the petitioner’s attorney is better than the respondent’s (one standard 
deviation above the mean value of Oral Argument Grade), a Justice has an 
83.6% chance of voting for the petitioner. When the respondent’s attorney 
is better (one standard deviation above the mean value of Oral Argument 
Grade), this number drops to 72.3%.  
 
 
petitioner’s lawyer was better (0.939) and one standard deviation below the mean when the 
respondent’s attorney was better (–1.162). All other variables were set at their means (or modal values 
for categorical variables), and we set each interaction term at the product of its two component 
variables. 
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FIGURE 4: THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE CONDITIONAL ON THE 
QUALITY OF ORAL ARGUMENTS 
 
It is also clear from our model that the salience of a case conditions the 
extent to which the quality of arguments affects Justices’ votes. Indeed, 
while Justices are more likely to reverse the judgment below when the 
petitioner’s attorney provides better arguments, this effect is much more 
pronounced in cases that do not appear on the front page of the New York 
Times. This relationship is seen clearly in Figure 5, which demonstrates 
the effect of oral argumentation separately for salient and nonsalient cases 
(the simulation applies to Justices who are one standard deviation above 
the mean on Ideological Compatibility with Appellant, and all other 
variables are set at the mean, or mode for a categorical variable).  
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FIGURE 5: THE EFFECT OF ORAL ADVOCACY CONDITIONAL ON CASE 
SALIENCE (WHETHER THE CASE APPEARED ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE 
NEW YORK TIMES) 
 
The final element of our story does not work as expected. We argued 
that when Justices have a greater need for information, they would be 
more likely to listen to the information presented to them. Our measure of 
this condition—legally complex cases (as seen in Oral Argument Grade * 
Case Complexity)—is statistically insignificant. One reason why this 
variable may not support our argument is that it may not tap informational 
asymmetry as much as it taps an information environment that is difficult 
for both attorneys and Justices.  
In summary, our data analyses show convincingly that Supreme Court 
Justices’ final votes on the merits of a case are heavily influenced by oral 
advocacy. The litigant whose attorney provides the stronger oral argument 
is substantially more likely to win the case, even after we control 
statistically for other factors likely to influence Justices’ votes.  
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IV. DO JUSTICES LISTEN TO ONE ANOTHER DURING ORAL 
ARGUMENTS?135 
The data in the previous part clearly indicate that the arguments 
counsel present to the Court affect the Justices’ votes. In this part, we 
further suggest that Justices can gather information about their colleagues’ 
views of a case from what they say during the oral arguments. Such 
behavior is intuitive as, in order for the Court’s decisions to become good 
law, five Justices must agree on the holding and legal rationale. As such, 
Justices need to be aware of where their colleagues stand and how they 
may possibly vote in the case once they reach conference and the opinion-
writing stage of the decision-making process.  
An example demonstrates how Justices may garner such information 
during the oral arguments. On May 29, 1973, the Supreme Court decided 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee 
(CBS, DNC).136 Justice Lewis F. Powell’s behavior six months prior to the 
final outcome—during oral arguments—provides an example of how these 
proceedings play an integral role in the Supreme Court’s decision-making 
process. An investigation of Justice Powell’s oral argument notes in CBS 
indicates that he paid particular attention to the questions asked and 
comments made by Justices White and Stewart about whether this case 
actually implicated First Amendment jurisprudence. At one point during 
the arguments Powell noted: “Justice Stewart pointed out that . . . the 
respondent’s argument is primarily an [equal protection] argument rather 
than First Amendment.”137 Similarly, he indicated Justice White’s view on 
this issue: “J. White noted this is not an ordinary 1st Amendment case 
because we have here an administrative agency decision finding that free 
speech interests are best met by present regulatory system.”138  
Justice Powell’s personal post–oral argument but pre-conference 
notations suggest that he was intrigued about the issues raised by Justices 
 
 
 135. Portions of this part are derived from JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 57–70. 
 136. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The case originated when the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) issued an administrative decision against the Democratic National Committee (DNC). 
Specifically, the DNC brought a complaint to the FCC when a Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 
affiliate refused to sell the organization airtime meant for editorial advertisements intended to help 
raise money and promote the DNC’s policy against the Vietnam War. Id. at 98. The FCC ruled against 
the DNC and argued that a broadcaster who provides full and fair coverage of public issues does not 
have to sell airtime to “responsible entities” for editorial purposes. Id. at 99. 
 137. Oral Argument Notes from Lewis F. Powell, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 16, 1972) (on 
file with the Washington University Law Review).  
 138. Id.  
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Stewart and White during these proceedings: “Argument suggests that the 
. . . issue may be [Equal Protection] rather than Free Speech.”139 
Additionally, during conference discussion, Justice Douglas’s notes as 
well as Justice Powell’s own notes demonstrate that Powell continued to 
think about the issue raised by Stewart and White. By the time conference 
concluded, Powell was inclined to agree with their interpretation of the 
case: “[W]e do not find state action issue as clear as other Justices. Yet, 
the arguments of Stewart and White are persuasive. I am impressed with 
view that in long run there will be greater free speech with a limited 
regulation of broadcast industry.”140 Thus, it seems that Justice Powell 
used the oral arguments to gather information about his colleagues’ 
preferences and that he may at times have been persuaded by their 
arguments.141  
During his tenure on the Court, Justice Blackmun took notes similar to 
Justice Powell’s during oral arguments. Specifically, he also noted quite a 
few comments made by his colleagues in many of the cases he heard. In 
this part, we focus on Justice Blackmun’s oral argument notes to test the 
assumption that Justices can and do utilize oral arguments as an 
opportunity to learn about how their colleagues want to decide specific 
cases. Evidence that Justices use these proceedings for this purpose 
suggests that they do more than gather information from the litigants and 
amici curiae who appear before them. Rather, we can say that they also 
find these proceedings important for the information they provide to the 
Justices about their colleagues. 
A. Information and Decision Making 
We argue that political actors need information to help them assess 
other actors’ preferences. While this information can come from many 
sources, game theory literature indicates that under certain conditions, 
“cheap talk”—defined as costless signals sent between decision makers—
can be an effective method of communication.142 Farrell suggests that if all 
 
 
 139. Id. at 8. Page eight of his oral arguments notes is the exact location where he notes Justice 
Stewart’s comments, while he notes Justice White’s comments on page seven. 
 140. Powell, supra note 137. 
 141. In the end, Justice Powell actually joined the majority coalition, as did Justice White. CBS, 
412 U.S. at 96. While Justice Stewart agreed with most of the decision, he wrote a separate concurring 
opinion. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring). 
 142. See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994); Crawford & 
Sobel, supra note 44; Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34 
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players expect to reach a state of equilibrium and will follow the 
equilibrium once it is announced, then “cheap talk can help coordinate 
behavior to produce . . . equilibria.”143 In addition, Crawford and Sobel 
indicate that players’ preferences must coincide with one another in order 
for coordination to occur.144 As Lupia and McCubbins explain, 
“[P]ersuasion does not occur if the principal believes that the speaker is 
likely to have conflicting interests. If, however, the principal believes that 
common interests are more likely, then persuasion is possible.”145  
For our purposes, cheap talk (in this case oral arguments) helps actors 
coordinate on two levels. First, it allows coordination between actors with 
similar preferences because it is inherently easier for them to agree than it 
is for actors with divergent views to do so. For example, Morrow notes 
that legislative debate “provides a way for legislators with similar 
underlying preferences to coordinate their votes,” because “[m]embers are 
unlikely to take cues from those whose underlying values are greatly 
different from their own.”146 More generally, this is a necessary condition 
in order for actors to coordinate with one another through cheap talk 
signals. 
Second, we suggest that it can help actors coordinate when groups 
make decisions under majority rule—where the median decision maker 
almost always must join a coalition in order for it to be a winning 
coalition.147 Although extant cheap talk literature does not specifically 
address communication in this manner, we argue that these signals provide 
one mechanism through which actors can learn the preferences of the 
pivotal voter because all actors in a group likely share some common 
interests with the median. As such, they can use the median’s cheap talk 
signals to assess her preferences, and then use these messages when trying 
to build a majority coalition. The general point, however, applies to both 
of our assumptions: in order for cheap talk to help actors coordinate, it is 
necessary that they at least perceive that they share common interests. 
We consider Supreme Court oral arguments as a forum for cheap talk 
between the Justices where each question and comment from a Justice 
 
 
(1987). 
 143. Farrell, supra note 142, at 35. 
 144. Crawford & Sobel, supra note 44. 
 145. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 44, at 50. 
 146. MORROW, supra note 142, at 256. 
 147. See generally DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); 
Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 361 (2001). 
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signals her preferences to the rest of the Court. More specifically, as the 
introduction suggests, Justices can use these proceedings to help 
coordinate with one another about the final policy outcomes of cases they 
hear. 
This discussion is consistent with the way many scholars and appellate 
attorneys view oral arguments. For instance, Wasby et al. argue that “it is 
not surprising that the judges would naturally use part of the oral argument 
time for getting across obliquely to their colleagues on the bench 
arguments regarding the eventual disposition of a case.”148 They conclude 
that “[a]nother, less noticed function is that oral argument serves as a 
means of communication between the judges.”149  
Appellate advocates agree with these scholarly accounts. Shapiro posits 
that “[d]uring the heat of debate on an important issue, counsel may find 
that one or more Justices are especially persistent in questioning and 
appear unwilling to relent. This may be the case when a Justice is making 
known his or her views in an emphatic manner . . . .”150 Neuborne goes a 
step further and suggests that he often feels like an intermediary between 
the Justices when he appears at oral argument: “Sometimes I think I am a 
post office. I think that one of the Justices wants to send a message to 
another Justice and they are essentially arguing through me.”151 
Drawing on the assumptions about decisions under risk and cheap talk, 
along with their application to the Supreme Court, we test two hypotheses 
about how Justices use oral arguments in the coalition formation process. 
First, as noted above, in order for cheap talk to be effective, it is necessary 
for actors to have some common interests. This leads us to hypothesize: 
Ideological Proximity to Blackmun Hypothesis: Justice Blackmun is 
more likely to pay attention to messages sent by colleagues who are 
closer to him ideologically than to assess the messages of those who 
are ideologically distant from him.  
Second, the median Justice is almost always needed for a majority 
coalition to form.152 Thus, we also hypothesize: 
 
 
 148. STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN 
EXPLORATION OF COURT STRATEGIES xviii (1977). 
 149. Wasby et al., supra note 11, at 418. 
 150. Stephen Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States, 33 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 529, 547 (1984). 
 151. Interview by Paul Duke with Burt Neuborne, Inez Milholland Professor of Civil Liberties 
and Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU, THIS HONORABLE COURT (PBS Video 1988). 
 152. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 64–65 (1964) (noting that Justices 
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Median Justice Hypothesis: Justice Blackmun is more likely to use 
oral arguments to assess the median Justice’s policy preferences 
than to assess those of other Justices. 
B. Data and Methods 
To test the above hypotheses, we constructed a data set that relies on 
oral argument notes taken by Justice Blackmun during his tenure on the 
Court. Specifically, we drew a sample of 1,155 cases between the 1985 
and 1993 Terms. We coded every unique sentence in Justice Blackmun’s 
notes to determine the type of information in each sentence and whether he 
attributed what was said to one of his colleagues. This resulted in 1,212 
references to policy questions, statements, or positions taken by his 
colleagues during the oral arguments in these cases.153 
For example, take Justice Blackmun’s oral argument notes in Belknap, 
Inc. v. Hale,154 presented in Figure 1. In those notes, Justice Blackmun 
specifically references the comments of Justices White and Rehnquist. In 
addition, he remarks that Justices White, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Chief 
Justice Burger were bearing down on the attorney, Samuel Alito. 
These notes help provide an explicit “measure of learning” for 
Blackmun. In other words, we submit that he wrote down a colleague’s 
question or comment when he believed he could learn something about 
that particular Justice’s preferences. In turn, we posit that he used this 
knowledge to determine which Justices were most likely to help him form 
a viable majority coalition. More generally, these notes provide an 
opportunity to study how political actors learn about other actors’ 
preferred outcomes. Given that scholars have rarely studied how political 
actors do so, Justice Blackmun’s notes offer insight into strategic 
interaction.155 
 
 
need “four additional votes . . . to speak with the institutional authority of the Court” and that 
additional votes have a smaller marginal value). Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck provide systematic 
empirical evidence of Murphy’s conjecture. See MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9. 
 153. We define policy statements as those arguments that focus on legal principles the Court 
should adopt, courses of action the Court should take, or a Justice’s beliefs about the content of public 
policy. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9; JOHNSON, supra note 11.  
 154. See supra note 37.  
 155. Certainly this analysis focuses on one Justice; however, given that game theory scholars 
argue that actors have information to make probability assessments about other actors’ preferences but 
almost never empirically explore where this information comes from, this is a contribution to the 
literature. 
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This data set includes an observation for each Justice in every case in 
the sample. The dependent variable, then, is a count of the total number of 
notations made by Justice Blackmun about each Justice’s statements per 
case. It varies between 0 and 4 comments for a given Justice in a case, and 
he noted approximately 0.13 comments per case for each of his colleagues. 
Because this variable is discrete, we cannot use traditional linear 
regression to statistically model this phenomenon. As Long points out, 
“[t]he use of the LRM [linear regression models] for count outcomes can 
result in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates.”156 A reasonable 
alternative is the Negative Binomial Regression model.157 
The statistical model includes two independent variables to test the 
above hypotheses. To measure the Ideological Distance from Blackmun 
for each Justice, we first determined each Justice’s ideological orientation 
based on Martin-Quinn scores, which provide an ideal point estimate for 
each Justice for each year he or she sat on the Court.158 We then calculated 
the absolute value of the ideological distance between Justice Blackmun 
and each of his colleagues. A larger, positive value therefore indicates that 
the Justice was ideologically more distant from Justice Blackmun, and a 
value of 0 implies a Justice shared Justice Blackmun’s ideological 
position. This variable has a mean of 2.38 (and a standard deviation of 
1.03), with a minimum value of 0.18 and a maximum value of 4.94. 
Second, to measure Median Justice, we used each Justice’s Martin-
Quinn score to determine if he or she occupied the median ideological 
position on the Court. We coded Median Justice as 1, and all other Justices 
received the value of 0.  
We also included several variables to control for other motivations for 
Justice Blackmun’s behavior. First, to control for whether Blackmun 
listened more to new colleagues or to those with whom he sat for a 
number of years, we calculated the number of Terms Blackmun sat with a 
given colleague. To do so, we summed the years they served together on 
the Court. The mean number of years served is 12.2, and this variable 
 
 
 156. LONG, supra note 115, at 217. 
 157. GREENE, supra note 73, at 931. While a Poisson model is also an appropriate modeling 
choice for count outcomes, the data we employ do not lend themselves to this technique. Indeed, in 
both models, the mean of the dependent variable is much smaller than its standard deviation. This 
means the Poisson model would produce consistent but inefficient estimates as well as downwardly 
biased standard errors. See LONG, supra note 115, at 230. Thus, we use the Negative Binomial 
Regression, which accounts for the overdispersion of zeros by allowing “the conditional variance of y 
to exceed its conditional mean.” Id.  
 158. Martin & Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation, supra note 82. 
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ranges from 0 (either Blackmun’s or a colleague’s first year on the Court) 
to 23 years.159 
Second, our measure of case complexity is similar to the one used 
earlier.160 The factor analysis161 includes the number of legal issues raised 
in the case and the number of legal provisions at issue for all cases decided 
by the Supreme Court between the 1970 and 1993 Terms; it resulted in a 
single factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.162 We assigned the factor 
score that resulted from this analysis for each case. The average Case 
Complexity measure in our sample was 0.14 with a standard deviation of 
0.59. 
Third, we account for the fact that Justice Blackmun may be more 
likely to listen to the Chief Justice because he holds the power to assign 
the majority opinion if he is in the majority coalition.163 To do so, we 
included a dummy variable that equals 1 for the Chief Justice and 0 for all 
associate Justices. 
Fourth, it is possible that Justice Blackmun was more likely to listen to 
Justices who had expertise in a particular area of law. To measure 
Expertise for each Justice, we first calculated an opinion ratio (OR) in 
specific issue areas. The OR is the number of cases in which a Justice 
wrote a dissent or concurrence divided by the number of like cases that 
reached the Court since that Justice’s appointment through the Term 
preceding the case in question.164 This measure is a standard one in the 
judicial politics literature.165 We then compared each Justice’s OR to the 
 
 
 159. The intuition here is that Justice Blackmun may be more likely to assess and note the 
arguments of new Justices because he does not know their preferences as well as he knows those of 
colleagues with whom he has worked for a number of years. This is akin to the literature on 
socialization, freshmen effects, and voting fluidity. See, e.g., Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshman Effects” 
for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1142 (1993); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the 
Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43 (1968); Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 113. 
Note that we also tested the new Justice variable by coding it as only the first Term that Blackmun and 
each colleague sat together on the Court. Doing so yields similar results.  
 160. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 161. See supra note 120. 
 162. See supra note 123. 
 163. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 
(1986); David Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme 
Court, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: READINGS IN PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 147–60 (Thomas P. 
Jahnige & Sheldon Goldman eds., 1968). 
 164. Because this measure is based on information up to the Term preceding the case in question, 
it is updated annually to reflect a Justice’s learning and the development of expertise over time. We 
take our definition of issue area from Spaeth’s value variable (which denotes the broad issue in a case, 
such as criminal rights, first amendment, economics, and the like). See SPAETH, supra note 81, at 52. 
 165. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9. 
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OR for the other Justices serving on the Court when the case was heard. 
Our measure of Expertise is then each Justice’s z-score, which compares 
the Justice’s OR with the mean OR for all Justices serving on the Court 
divided by the standard deviation of OR among that group of Justices. A 
larger, positive score indicates that a Justice has more expertise than the 
average for all Justices then on the Court, whereas a smaller, negative 
score reflects less expertise than the average Justice. The mean of this 
variable is 0.02, and the standard deviation is 0.95, varying from a low of 
–2.26 to a high of 2.67. 
Finally, we included a variable to capture whether Justice Blackmun 
was more inclined to cite comments by his colleagues in salient cases. We 
used the level of amicus curiae participation in a case on the merits as our 
measure of salience.166 Given that amicus participation has dramatically 
increased over the Terms included in this sample, we calculate Term-
specific z-scores to determine whether a case had more amicus filings than 
the average case heard during a Term. This variable has a mean of 0.02 
and a standard deviation of 0.99. 
C. Results 
Table 3 provides the results of the statistical analysis.167 To interpret 
the coefficients in our negative binomial regression model, we translated 
them into predicted probabilities. Note first that when all of the variables 
in the model are held at their mean or mode, there is a 9.4% probability 
that Justice Blackmun will note at least one comment from a given 
colleague. The model confirms our first hypothesis: that Justice Blackmun 
is more likely to note one or more comments made by colleagues who are 
ideologically more proximate to him. Substantively, there is only a 7.2% 
probability that Blackmun will note one or more comments from a Justice 
farther from him ideologically (specifically, two standard deviations above 
the mean value of Ideological Distance from Blackmun). However, this 
 
 
 166. See JAMES L. GIBSON, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATA BASE, PHASE II 
(University of Houston 1997). 
 167. Note that the Negative Binomial Model, rather than a Poisson, is the appropriate modeling 
choice. We determine this through a significance test of the alpha coefficient, presented in Table 3. A 
Z-test of Ho:α = 0 can be used to test for overdispersion, since when α is 0, the Negative Binomial 
reduces to a Poisson. LONG, supra note 115, at 237. The results demonstrate that α is greater than 0. 
Id. Thus, the Negative Binomial is better able to capture this phenomenon than a Poisson model. Id. 
Additionally, the highly significant Wald χ2 test indicates that the Negative Binomial model is more 
appropriate than the Poisson. Id.  
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probability increases to 13.6% for Justices who are ideologically close to 
Justice Blackmun (specifically, two standard deviations below the mean 
value of Ideological Distance from Blackmun). This result provides initial 
evidence in support of the cheap talk argument that it is easier to send and 
receive messages (which may help two actors coordinate) when their 
preferences are similar.  
The coefficient for Median Justice does not support our hypothesis that 
Justice Blackmun is more likely to pay attention to the median Justice on 
the Court. In fact, additional analyses indicate that he also does not focus 
on Justices closer to the median. Instead, the dominant pattern seems to be 
that Justice Blackmun tended to avoid writing down comments of Justices 
who were ideologically distant from the median Justice. 
TABLE 3: NEGATIVE BINOMINAL REGRESSION OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S 
PROPENSITY TO RECORD COMMENTS OF COLLEAGUES AT ORAL 
ARGUMENTS (1970–94) 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Significance 
(two-tailed 
test) 
Ideological Distance 
from Blackmun 
–0.17 0.03 0.00 
Median Justice –0.10 0.10 0.32 
Years Served with 
Blackmun 
–0.01 0.01 0.01 
Case Complexity –0.14 0.07 0.06 
Chief Justice   0.77 0.09 0.00 
Expert Justice   0.02 0.03 0.42 
Case Salience   0.10 0.04 0.01 
Constant –1.53 0.10 0.00 
Number of Observations 9078   
Log Likelihood  –3690.44     
Wald Chi Square 98.88  0.00 
Alpha   1.26 0.19 0.00 
Three of the control variables provide additional understanding for 
why Justice Blackmun focused on this information. He was more likely to 
record comments made by Justices with whom he had served for a shorter 
period of time, made by the Chief Justice, and in salient cases. His 
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probability of citing comments or questions made by the Chief Justice is 
18.1%, as compared to 9.4% for associate Justices. In salient cases (those 
two standard deviations above the mean), he had a 12.4% probability of 
citing a given Justice, and this number decreased slightly to 11.5% in 
nonsalient cases (two standard deviations below the mean on this 
variable). Justice Blackmun was also less likely to cite comments in his 
notes for colleagues who had served with him for a longer period of time. 
In the first year a Justice was on the bench with Justice Blackmun, 
Blackmun had a 11.5% chance of making notations at orals about her, 
while this number lowered to 8.6% by the time they had served together 
for 23 years (this comparison reflects a two-standard deviation shift 
around the mean of this variable). 
While there is a quite large confidence interval around the point 
estimate for Expert Justice (and thus we have much less confidence in this 
effect), the data suggest Justice Blackmun may have been slightly more 
likely to note comments of those he believed were experts in a particular 
area of law. The probability that he noted a comment from a perceived 
expert was 9.8%, while it dropped to 9.0% for those who seem to have 
little expertise with an issue area. It does not appear that Justice Blackmun 
was any more likely to reference comments of colleagues during orals in 
complex cases.  
V. CAN JUSTICES PREDICT CASE OUTCOMES DURING ORAL ARGUMENTS? 
The findings in the previous part provide preliminary support for the 
theoretical claim about why oral arguments are vitally important for the 
Court: they provide necessary information that helps Justices learn about 
how their colleagues want to act so that they can more effectively build 
coalitions when deciding on the merits of a case. An additional question is, 
what do they do with that information? One answer is that they try to 
predict exactly how their colleagues will vote in cases they hear. 
We know this is sometimes the case because Justice Blackmun 
exhibited this behavior. Three examples demonstrate how he did so. 
Figure 1, which presented the notes Justice Blackmun took in Belknap, 
Inc. v. Hale,168 included the notation of “+ R-W-CJ-P.” This reflected 
Justice Blackmun’s prediction that Justices Rehnquist (R), White (W), 
Powell (P), and Chief Justice Burger (CJ) would affirm (+) the lower court 
 
 
 168. See supra note 37.  
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decision.169 During its 1979 Term, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. 
McRae170 which, inter alia, held that the Hyde Amendment did not violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.171 Although this case is 
important because of its implications for the right of poor women to obtain 
abortions, it is also interesting for what transpired two months prior to the 
Court’s final decision. While sitting for the oral arguments in McRae, 
Justice Blackmun wrote a note predicting how the case would turn out. 
Specifically, he speculated that “[a]ll Justices in their questions telegraph 
their attitudes. Result will be 6-3 or 5-4 to reverse.”172 
In McRae, Justice Blackmun seemed quite sure his prediction was 
accurate, while in other cases he seemed less sure of his conjecture. For 
instance, in Tower v. Glover173 he wrote “– 5-4, we [sic] would guess or + 
5-4.”174 Here, he predicted that Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and he 
would vote to affirm, while Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist 
and O’Connor would vote to reverse.175 He was unsure how Justice 
Stevens and Justice Powell would vote.176 In still other cases, Blackmun 
did not attempt to predict his colleagues’ ultimate positions. 
These examples indicate that during oral arguments, Justice Blackmun 
sometimes attempted to predict case outcomes as well as how some or all 
of his colleagues would vote.177 Interestingly, there is significant variation 
 
 
 169. A “+” signifies that Justice Blackmun expected a vote to affirm, while a “–” indicates that 
Justice Blackmun predicted a vote to reverse. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court in this 
case, affirming the lower court decision. His decision was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices 
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor. Justice Powell joined Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion.  
 170. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 171. The Court ruled that states are not required to pay for medically necessary abortions for 
which federal reimbursement was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. Id. at 318. Additionally, 
the majority held that the federal funding restrictions established by the Hyde Amendment were 
constitutionally valid. Id. at 322. 
 172. Oral Argument Notes from Justice Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, (Apr. 4, 1980) 
(on file with Library of Congress). He made similar comments in many other cases. For example, in 
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992), he wrote, “Justices telegraph their posit[ions]—CJ—A—K.” 
Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 2, 1991) (on file with 
Library of Congress). 
 173. 467 U.S. 914 (1984). In Glover, the Court ruled that state public defenders are not immune 
from liability for misconduct. Id. at 916. Justice Blackmun’s convention is to use a negative sign as 
shorthand for “reverse”, and a positive sign as shorthand for “affirm”. 
 174. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 22, 1984) 
(on file with the Library of Congress.).  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Scholars have attempted to predict the Justices’ votes based on how they act during oral 
arguments. See, e.g., Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion Of Devil's Advocacy: How the Justices of 
the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
271 (2004). 
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in the frequency with which he predicted his colleagues’ votes. In the oral 
argument notes he took during cases decided in our sample of cases (1986 
to 1993 Terms), he made predictions for 12.4% of the participating 
Justices, while he predicted at least one of his colleagues’ votes in over 
34% of those cases. The question we ask in this part is, why did Justice 
Blackmun jot down this information for some Justices in some cases and 
ignore some colleagues in other cases? Was it simply an exercise born of 
boredom or fancy and thus a random compilation of his colleagues’ 
anticipated behavior on the merits? Or is there a strategic motivation 
behind the circumstances under which he attempted to predict his 
colleagues’ votes? 
Just as in the previous part, we argue that the collegial nature of 
Supreme Court decision making explains in part why Justice Blackmun 
noted predictions for some Justices and not for others. As such, we posit 
that while listening to the exchanges between his colleagues and counsel 
during oral argument, Blackmun considered information that could help 
him come to terms with the coalitions that might eventually form. He then 
used these proceedings to build himself a map that would enhance his 
ability to be forward thinking as the Court moved toward the resolution of 
a case. To support this argument, we offer one final analysis based on a 
sample of Justice Blackmun’s oral argument notes from cases decided 
between the 1985 and 1993 Terms—specifically whether he attempted to 
predict his colleagues’ votes on the merits in the sample of cases we 
employed in the previous part.  
A. Theoretical Foundation 
In order for Supreme Court Justices to make decisions, they must be 
able to assess the likely outcomes of those choices. The outcomes that 
most concern Supreme Court Justices are the legal doctrines articulated in 
the Court’s opinions and the distributional consequences they anticipate 
those legal rules will have on American society.178 The legal doctrines 
announced in the Court’s majority opinions, of course, depend on the 
agreement of at least a majority of the Justices. In game-theory terms, the 
Justices’ payoffs are thus interdependent; that is, the payoff a Justice will 
receive in a given case (as flowing from the ultimate effects of a decision) 
result from an aggregation of all of the Justices’ choices in a case. As a 
 
 
 178. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9; HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 9; MALTZMAN ET AL., 
supra note 9. 
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result, information about their colleagues’ preferences and likely choices 
are necessary for Justices to make choices capable of moving legal 
doctrine in their preferred direction. One important issue is determining 
exactly how Justices go about gathering the information they need about 
their colleagues when making decisions. In this part, we argue that Justices 
can attempt to forecast their colleagues’ actions in a case by using 
information gleaned from questions and comments made during oral 
arguments. 
Recent research provides evidence that, although Justices may know 
their colleagues’ preferences generally,179 they may not be so certain in 
specific cases. First, Justices’ preferences can and do change over time.180 
Second, Justices’ preferences vary across issue areas.181 Third, some cases 
tap multiple issue dimensions,182 which creates ambiguity about which 
dimension is controlling.183 This combination of factors suggests that even 
though Justices may be able to generally predict their colleagues’ 
preferences, they often possess some uncertainty about how other Justices 
want to act in particular cases.184 Recent research, for example, indicates 
that the Chief Justice is more likely to pass at conference when he has 
greater uncertainty about his colleagues’ votes. As such, he can view his 
colleagues’ conference votes and then determine which vote will best 
advance his policy interests.185  
Because Justices cannot always anticipate their colleagues’ actions in 
specific cases, they must procure information about their colleagues’ 
views. While existing literature indicates that many opportunities exist for 
Justices to gather this information—e.g., certiorari votes in the present 
case186 and past merits votes in similar cases187—oral arguments provide 
 
 
 179. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 9; MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9; Timothy R. Johnson, 
James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 348 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson et al.]. 
 180. Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Do Political Preferences 
Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801 (1998); Epstein et al., 
supra note 82; Martin & Quinn, supra note 82.  
 181. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91. 
 182. SPAETH, supra note 81. 
 183. Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 113. 
 184. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 9. 
 185. Johnson et al., supra note 179, at 356–58. 
 186. Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision 
Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995); 
Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-
Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999). 
 187. JOHNSON, supra note 11. 
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an important forum for them to do so. Specifically, as the previous part 
demonstrates, we consider these proceedings as a forum where Justices 
can gather information about their colleagues’ preferences by listening to 
the questions and comments they make.  
The notion that oral arguments can help Justices learn about their 
colleagues’ preferences in particular cases is supported by the fact that the 
Justices ask myriad questions during these proceedings. Johnson, for 
example, finds that in a sample of 75 cases, the Justices asked questions or 
made comments a total of 5,567 times.188 During the time frame of his 
study, oral arguments averaged one hour in length, which means that the 
Justices asked almost 75 questions per hour. Additionally, Johnson finds 
that Justice Powell noted 193 comments made by his colleagues in a 
sample of 150 cases decided between 1972 and 1986.189 Further, Justice 
Blackmun wrote down 1,212 comments regarding his colleagues’ 
questions at oral arguments in our sample of 1,155 cases.190 Given the vast 
number of questions and comments from the bench, those sitting on the 
Court can learn about their colleagues’ views of a case during oral 
arguments.191 This argument is consistent with the evidence we present 
from the previous part which suggests that Justices themselves, scholars, 
and appellate attorneys believe this type of information transmission takes 
place during these proceedings. 
B. Hypotheses 
We are interested in determining the conditions under which Justice 
Blackmun would predict a colleague’s vote. Johnson’s work on oral 
arguments192 is instructive here. He demonstrates that Justice Powell took 
 
 
 188. Id. at 40–41. 
 189. Id. 
 190. The vast majority of his notes refer to substantive comments made by his colleagues, but 
sometimes he made notes about what he thought their questioning meant. For example, in Hilton v. 
South Carolina Railways Commissions, 502 U.S. 197 (1991), Justice Blackmun was intrigued by 
Justice White: “BRW is the one only ? here. Why is he inter[ested]?” Oral Argument Notes from 
Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 8, 1991) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
 191. Of course, not all Justices question the attorneys, and some almost never speak during these 
proceedings (as in Justice Thomas’s reputation). In Collins v. Harker Heights (1992), Justice 
Blackmun noted the exact time when Justice Thomas asked his first question from the bench: “T asks 
his 1st ? 1:43 pm.” Additionally, in Building Trades Council v. Associated Builders, 507 U.S. 218 
(1993) he noted (with a degree of surprise) another question by Thomas: “CT asks a ?!!” Although we 
do not analyze it here, silence may also help Justices glean information about their colleagues. In 
Hilton, Justice Blackmun’s notes state that, “AS is quiet here. Why?” 
 192. JOHNSON, supra note 11. 
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notes about his colleagues’ questions or comments during these 
proceedings when he thought he could learn something from them or when 
the comments they made might have been helpful for building a coalition. 
Like Powell, the previous part demonstrates that Blackmun acted in a 
similar manner during oral arguments.  
Here, we assert that Justice Blackmun’s practice of forecasting his 
colleagues’ votes is in part a reflection of how he saw the case beginning 
to shape up during oral arguments. Justice Blackmun, we suggest, went a 
step further by actually predicting colleagues’ votes in an effort to assess 
the lay of the land before conference. More formally, we argue that his 
prediction notes helped him initially determine the contours of the 
conference coalitions that might form after the arguments. Based on this 
assumption, we derive hypotheses pertaining to the factors that influenced 
Blackmun’s decision to note a prediction of one or more of his colleagues.  
Our main focus is on the extent to which Justice Blackmun used 
information he gleaned from his colleagues during oral arguments to help 
determine how they would eventually vote on the merits of a case. We 
argue he was more likely to predict his colleagues’ positions in a case if he 
took more notes regarding their oral argument comments and questions.  
The point is intuitive: when Justice Blackmun recorded more notes 
regarding a Justice then, that Justice is more likely to have revealed 
information (signals in game theoretic terms) about her preferences over 
the outcomes of a case. As such, Blackmun should be better equipped to 
predict how that Justice would decide. This leads us to predict that: 
Oral Argument Hypothesis: Justice Blackmun is more likely to 
predict his colleagues’ votes in a case when he has taken more notes 
regarding their comments during oral argument. 
Certainly other factors may influence Justice Blackmun’s decision to 
predict a colleague’s vote. In particular, as we note in the previous parts, 
ideology can and does affect how Justices interact with one another. As 
such, we also include two variables that focus on the ideological 
relationship between Justices. First, we focus on arguably the most 
important Justice on the Court—the median Justice. Scholars have long 
recognized that, in a majority-rule setting, the median decision maker is 
often in a privileged position.193 This is certainly true for the median 
Justice on the Supreme Court. For example, between the 1986 and 1993 
 
 
 193. See supra note 147. 
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Terms, the median Justice was a member of the majority opinion coalition 
89.8% of the time.194 This has led some scholars to suggest that the 
median Justice often drives case outcomes.195 Given the median Justice’s 
position and power, we predict that Justice Blackmun will be more 
concerned about that Justice. This leads us to hypothesize that:  
Median Justice Hypothesis: Justice Blackmun is more likely to 
predict the votes of the median Justice on the Court.  
We also suggest Justice Blackmun will be more likely to think about 
the comments of Justices who are ideologically aligned with him. The 
intuition, as in the previous part, is that such Justices are more likely to 
provide credible information for him—information that he can view as 
more inherently trustworthy because of the Justice’s ideological similarity 
to him. Thus, we posit: 
Ideological Distance from Blackmun Hypothesis: Justice Blackmun 
is more likely to predict Justices who are ideologically closer to his 
position. 
We also focus on additional factors that might affect whether Justice 
Blackmun makes a prediction. These variables, which capture Justice- and 
case-specific factors, are identical to those we employed in the previous 
part and are discussed below.  
C. Data and Methods 
To test the above hypotheses, we used the same sample of cases as in 
the previous part with an observation for each Justice in each case.196 Our 
dependent variable focuses on whether Justice Blackmun made a 
prediction for a particular Justice in a case and is coded 1 if he made a 
 
 
 194. To calculate this, we used the Justice’s Martin-Quinn scores to identify the median Justice. 
See Martin & Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation, supra note 82. The Justices’ support of the 
majority was derived from SPAETH, supra note 81, selecting observations associated with case 
citations and split votes, as well as orally argued opinions (whether signed or per curiam). 
 195. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Who 
Controls the Law? The Majority Opinion Author, the Median Justice, and the Status Quo on the 
United States Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890 (2007); Chad Westerland, Who Owns the 
Majority Opinion (Aug. 28, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, on file with the authors). 
 196. We do not include cases for which Spaeth was unable to code an ideological direction for the 
case outcome. See SPAETH, supra note 81. We also excluded observations for Justices who did not 
participate in a case.  
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prediction and 0 otherwise. In this sample, Justice Blackmun made 1,128 
predictions in his oral argument notes, representing about 12.4% of his 
colleagues’ votes on the merits. Because this variable is dichotomous, we 
employ a logit model197 with robust standard errors clustered on case.  
To test our main hypothesis of interest—that Justices send signals 
about their preferences during oral arguments—we coded every sentence 
of Blackmun’s oral argument notes to determine whether he wrote down 
legal or policy comments with attribution to a colleague. We also coded 
instances where he noted the nature, but not necessarily the content, of one 
of his colleague’s questions or comments. For instance, in Collins v. 
Harker Heights198 he writes, “Hostile ?s [Chief Justice Rehnquist], [Justice 
Scalia]” as they are asking questions of the petitioner’s attorney.199 We 
believe these insights also indicate that Blackmun is taking signals based 
on exactly how questions are asked. In our sample of cases, Blackmun 
noted a mean of 0.13 questions or comments per Justice in each case, and 
the Oral Argument Information variable ranges from 0 to 4 (per case). We 
expect the number of references to a colleague’s questions at oral 
arguments to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. 
Before moving on, we should point out a potential endogeneity issue, 
which renders the inference we can draw from this empirical correlation 
suggestive rather than definitive. It is possible that a correlation between 
Blackmun’s tendency to write down comments about a colleague’s 
comments at oral arguments and his tendency to predict their vote results 
because he is preoccupied with that Justice. As a result, his proclivity to be 
preoccupied with given Justices leads him to both write down their 
comments from oral arguments and predict their votes. 
To test the two ideological hypotheses, we employed the same 
measures we used when predicting whether Justice Blackmun would note 
a colleague’s questions or comments. Thus, using the Martin-Quinn 
ideological scores, we included a variable for the absolute value of a 
Justice’s ideological distance from Blackmun. We also included a 
dichotomous variable for Median Justice, coded as 1 if that Justice, 
 
 
 197. The logit model is a member of the class of nonlinear models. See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 
supra note 113 and sources therein.  See supra note 74 on robust standard errors. 
 198. 503 U.S. 115 (1992). 
 199. Oral Argument Notes from Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 5, 1991) (on 
file with the Library of Congress).  
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according to Martin-Quinn scores, was the median on the Court in that 
year.200 
In order to calculate the number of Terms Justice Blackmun sat with a 
given colleague, we summed the years they served together on the Court. 
The mean number of years served is 12.2, and this variable ranges from 0 
(either Justice Blackmun’s or a colleague’s first year on the Court) to 23 
years. 
To measure case complexity, we conducted a factor analysis of all 
cases decided by the Supreme Court between the 1970 and 1994 Terms. 
Using Spaeth,201 we counted the number of legal issues and the number of 
legal provisions at issue in a case. The factor analysis resulted in a single 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.202 We assigned the factor score 
that resulted from this analysis for each case. The average Case 
Complexity is 0.14 with a standard deviation of 0.59. 
We also included variables to measure whether Blackmun was more 
likely to predict the votes of the Chief Justices and issue experts in a 
case.203 Finally, we follow Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck204 in arguing 
that the political salience of a case can be measured by the amount of 
amicus curiae participation.  Since amicus participation has dramatically 
increased over the Terms included in our sample, we calculated Term-
specific z-scores to determine whether a case had more amicus filings than 
the average case heard during a given Term. This variable should have a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable. 
D. Results 
Our principal substantive interest is whether Justices can use the 
questions and comments made by colleagues at oral arguments to help 
them reduce their uncertainty about a case. When Justices initially sit for 
arguments, they often have uncertainty about the contours of a case and 
about how their colleagues will decide. These proceedings, we argue, can 
help them reduce this uncertainty and better understand the case and the 
likely actions of their colleagues on the merits. The data analyzed in Table 
4 provide initial support for this argument. Specifically, we tested our oral 
 
 
 200. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 201. See SPAETH, supra note 81. 
 202. See supra note 120 (on factor analysis). 
 203. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (explaining how we measured issue experts).  
 204. See supra note 9. 
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argument hypothesis by examining whether Justice Blackmun was more 
likely to predict the votes of his colleagues (as recorded in his oral 
argument notes) if he wrote down information about their questions and 
comments. Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. 
TABLE 4: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S PROPENSITY TO 
PREDICT HIS COLLEAGUES’ VOTES ON THE MERITS DURING ORAL 
ARGUMENTS 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Significance 
(two-tailed test) 
Oral 
Argument 
Notes 
  0.78 0.07 0.00 
Ideological 
Distance 
from 
Blackmun 
  0.07 0.03 0.02 
Median 
Justice –0.19 0.10 0.06 
Years 
Served with 
Blackmun 
  –0.002 0.005 0.66 
Case 
Complexity –0.10 0.12 0.39 
Chief Justice   0.95 0.08 0.00 
Expert 
Justice   0.06 0.03 0.08 
Case 
Salience   0.09 0.05 0.08 
Constant        –2.37 0.11 0.00 
Number of 
Observations 9078   
Log 
Likelihood  –3238.15   
Wald Chi 
Square      453.58  0.00 
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The positive and statistically significant coefficient for Oral Argument 
Notes provides preliminary evidence for this argument. Substantively 
speaking, Justice Blackmun had a 9.6% chance of predicting one of his 
colleague’s votes on the merits if he did not record any information about 
his or her questions at oral argument. The likelihood of his focusing on the 
future vote of one of his colleagues increased to 18.9% and 33.7%, 
respectively, if his notes contained one or two references to that Justice’s 
questions at oral argument.205 If he made three such notes, then this 
probability jumped to 52.5%. It appears that Justice Blackmun did indeed 
use oral arguments as an initial device to think about the likely vote line-
up in the case, although we caution the reader due to the endogeneity 
between the oral argument variable and Blackmun’s propensity to make 
predictions. 
Several of the additional variables included in the model also manifest 
a systematic relationship with Justice Blackmun’s tendency to predict the 
other Justices’ votes. First, Justice Blackmun was more likely to predict 
the votes of Justices who were ideologically more distant from him. One 
should note that this relationship is opposite of that we discovered with 
regard to Justice Blackmun is recording comments by his colleagues. The 
substantive effect of this variable, however, is slight; when changing 
Ideological Distance from Blackmun from two standard deviations above 
to below its mean value, the probability of his recording a colleague’s vote 
changes from 10.6% to 8.3%. Justice Blackmun, contrary to our 
hypothesis, is not more likely to predict the median Justice’s vote. In fact, 
he is also not more likely to predict the votes of other Justices close to the 
median, but rather tends to be considerably less likely to predict the votes 
of Justices who are far removed ideologically from the median Justice.  
He also appears to be more likely to predict the votes of the Chief 
Justice, Justices who are experts in an area of law, and Justices deciding 
salient cases. For instance, when he did not perceive a colleague to be an 
expert in an issue area (a Justice who is two standard deviations below the 
mean expertise level), he had a 8.7% probability of predicting that 
colleague’s vote. However, if the Justice was perceived to be an expert (a 
Justice who is two standard deviations above the mean expertise level), 
this percentage increased to 10.6%. He was also dramatically more likely 
to predict the Chief Justice’s vote, and he did so about 21.7% of the time, 
as compared to predicting 9.6% of associate Justices’ votes. In salient 
 
 
 205. We hold constant for other variables at their mean values (or modal if a categorical variable). 
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cases, Justice Blackmun had a 9.9% chance of predicting a given Justice’s 
vote, while this number dropped to 7.6% in less salient cases (where we 
manipulated salience two standard deviations about its mean value). 
Finally, he does not appear to be more or less likely to predict the votes of 
Justices with whom he has served longer or Justices deciding complex 
cases.  
The question we have not yet answered is whether the predictions 
Justice Blackmun made were accurate. While we do not fully answer this 
question here, we offer some insight. Justice Blackmun made correct 
predictions 76% of the time. Additionally, Blackmun was slightly more 
successful when he noted more of the questions and comments made by 
his colleagues during oral arguments. Indeed, when he only recorded one 
notation about his colleagues’ comments, he successfully predicted the 
Justice’s final vote 74% of the time. However, if he noted more than one 
reference, his success increased to 80%. 
These initial findings are consistent with the attitudinal model, where 
Segal and Spaeth206 predicted 71% of votes correctly. It is also consistent 
with Boucher and Segal’s207 argument that Justices should be able to 
predict case outcomes. As they put it, “[f]orming a reasonably accurate 
probability distribution [of case outcomes] should be well within the 
capabilities of the Justices. If learned outsiders such as Spaeth can predict 
Court decisions with a fair degree of accuracy, then the ability of those on 
the Court to predict outcomes must be higher still.”208 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We began this Article with a discussion of the prevailing views of the 
role of oral arguments. The predominant belief among lawyers, legal 
scholars, and Supreme Court Justices is that oral argument plays an 
important role in the decision-making process. Most political scientists 
who study courts, however, have either ignored oral arguments or assumed 
they were largely irrelevant. We started from the premise that oral 
 
 
 206. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 325. Note, however, that we may be comparing apples to 
oranges. Segal and Spaeth try to predict all civil liberties votes, whereas Justice Blackmun does not 
predict every vote in every case. Thus, while this is a good illustration, we cannot make a true 
comparison on this point. However, in those cases where he did make predictions, he was quite good 
at doing so. 
 207. Boucher & Segal, supra note 186. 
 208. Boucher & Segal, supra note 186, at 827 (internal citations omitted). 
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arguments matter by providing information to Justices. Our goal was to 
offer systematic empirical evidence for this assertion.  
We provided such evidence through the use of the papers of Justice 
Harry Blackmun. Justice Blackmun recorded notes during oral arguments 
and, among other things, assigned a “grade” to each attorney arguing 
before the Court. We used these evaluations as a quantitative measure of 
the quality of oral argumentation by a lawyer before the Court. Our data 
analysis shows, first, that these grades are reflective of the quality of oral 
arguments and are not tainted by ideological bias on Justice Blackmun’s 
part. As a way to validate his grades as an indicator of quality, we utilized 
a linear regression model, where we explained each attorney’s grade as a 
function of variables relating to their credibility and professional 
experience. We show, for instance, that attorneys who have had prior 
experience arguing before the Court, are part of the Washington, D.C., 
“legal elite” (such as prior Supreme Court clerks and private Washington, 
D.C., attorneys), or sit in a privileged governmental position (such as the 
Solicitor General’s office) generally receive higher grades from 
Blackmun.  
In addition, our evidence clearly indicates that the Justices’ votes in a 
case depend substantially on the relative quality of the lawyers appearing 
before the Court. We used each Justice’s vote in a case as our dependent 
variable, and our key independent variable captured the differential in the 
quality of oral argumentation of the attorneys in a case. Our data analysis 
shows that the probability of a Justice voting for a litigant rises 
substantially if that litigant’s attorney presented better oral arguments, 
even after controlling for other likely explanations of a Justice’s vote. 
Indeed, even Justices who ideologically disagreed with the point of view 
being advocated by an attorney were more likely to vote for her client if 
she made the stronger arguments.  
We also sought to show that Justices can reduce their uncertainty about 
a case by listening to their colleagues’ questions and comments during 
these proceedings. To do so, we drew again on evidence found in the 
private papers of Justice Blackmun. During oral arguments, Blackmun 
would take notes regarding his colleagues’ questions, as well as sometimes 
try to predict their ultimate vote on the merits. We suggested that 
Blackmun recorded this information in part to assist him in assessing the 
positions of his colleagues and the issues in a case.  
This portion of our analysis took place in two steps. First, we examined 
the circumstances under which Blackmun took notes regarding the policy 
questions or substantive statements made by his colleagues during orals. 
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We argued that if his motivation for taking these notes included a desire to 
help him understand the case, then we should witness him recording 
information from Justices who were ideologically more proximate to him 
and the median Justice on the Court. Since the former Justices share his 
ideological point of view, they would offer credible information for 
Blackmun’s consideration. The latter Justice is often centrally important to 
the coalition formation process, given that the Court is a majority rule 
institution (at least at the merits phase). Our data analysis confirms the 
former hypothesis but not the latter. In addition, we argued that if the 
information he gleaned from oral arguments was valuable, we should find 
a strong and positive correlation between the frequency with which he 
recorded notes for a particular Justice’s questions at oral arguments and 
his attempt to predict that colleague’s vote. The data analysis provides 
support for this relationship and thus offers additional evidence for the 
informational value of oral arguments in Supreme Court decision making.  
What, then, are the implications of this study? First, and most 
generally, it illustrates the utility of empirical legal research. While legal 
scholars, political scientists, lawyers, and judges often discuss oral 
arguments—putting forward empirical claims about the influence of these 
proceedings (or lack thereof) on Justices’ decisions—their 
characterizations are based almost entirely on anecdote and speculation.209 
By developing a quantitative indicator of oral argumentation quality and 
subjecting it to a series of empirical tests, we offer substantial evidence for 
the position that oral arguments provide the Justices with information and 
that the attorneys’ arguments influence the Justices’ votes in a case.  
Second, our results have implications for a debate among political 
scientists about the determinants of Justices’ votes on the merits of a case. 
Attitudinalists argue that a Supreme Court Justice’s preference over policy 
outcomes is the only systematic factor that causes her to vote for one 
outcome over another.210 We show, contrary to that claim, that the quality 
of oral arguments strongly influences the Justices’ final votes on the 
merits. Indeed, even when Justices are ideologically opposed to the 
outcome being pushed by an attorney, the quality of that attorney’s oral 
arguments influences a Justice’s final vote on the merits. In short, these 
data show that the attitudinal model is inaccurate in its main theoretical 
claim.  
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Third, our study builds on research that shows how the process of 
decision making on the Supreme Court influences outcomes. Legal 
realists, and their intellectual offspring attitudinalists, place little 
explanatory emphasis on the process of decision making and instead give 
primacy to Justices’ ideological points of view.211 In the last decade, 
however, scholars have catalogued the integral effect of intra-Court rules, 
norms, and procedures on the Supreme Court. This research demonstrates 
that considerations stemming from institutional rules affect the Justices’ 
choices, including their decisions to bargain and negotiate, the way in 
which they interpret precedent, and how they vote in a case.212 In showing 
that oral arguments matter, we shed further light on how the judicial 
process can influence outcomes.  
Since this article is one of the first systematic empirical analyses of this 
area, a variety of questions remain. For example, there are two paths 
through which lawyers can influence a Justice’s decision. First, a lawyer 
may make an argument that changes a Justice’s mind, leading a Justice 
who prefers position “X” to instead prefer position “Y.” This type of 
influence means that a lawyer actually changes a Justice’s set of desires or 
goals as they relate to law and policy. Second, a lawyer may provide 
information that affects a Justice’s beliefs. Beliefs are a Justice’s 
understandings about social causation, meaning her ideas about the 
relationship between particular means and the ends that would result from 
employing them.213 In this Article, we do not theorize about which 
mechanism is likely to operate. Instead, we show that oral arguments 
influence Justices’ decisions, and determining the circumstances under 
which one or the other of these two mechanisms is at work must be teased 
out in future research.214 In addition, our examination of how Justice 
Blackmun used oral arguments to think ahead regarding the building of 
coalitions in a case is preliminary, and future work should further refine 
our understanding of this aspect of oral arguments. 
We have brought to bear a great deal of empirical evidence to suggest 
that the quality of advocacy, as well as the interactions between Justices 
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 212. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9; HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 9; MALTZMAN ET AL., 
supra note 9; Johnson et al., supra note 179.  
 213. See Jon Elster, Rational Choice (1986) (distinguishing between beliefs and preferences). 
 214. Under many scenarios, it is likely that one would encounter observational equivalence across 
these two types of influence, meaning that both predict the Justice would behave in the same way. One 
way to overcome this problem would be to develop hypotheses under which a Justice’s observed 
behavior would differ if one, rather than the other, path of influence was at work.  
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themselves, during the one-hour exchanges between Court and counsel 
plays an important role in how our nation’s court of last resort decides 
some of the most important legal issues of the day. 
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